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Abstract
The secular decline in the labor share since the 1980’s is a global phenomenon,
and a trend that is concurrent with large liberalization episodes worldwide. In this
paper we investigate the liberalization episode in India during the 1990’s, which has
been characterized by large and unexpected changes in trade and foreign investment
policies. Contrary to what might be expected given the reduction in the aggregate
data, we uncover a trade channel that raises the labor-to-capital relative factor shares
in India. Our results reveal access to foreign capital as a new mechanism through which
openness affects factor shares. An increase in the variety and share of foreign capital
in the capital stock enhances capital-augmenting technology, which in turn raises real
wages and the relative labor share. We find capital and R&D intensities, importing
status, and the borrowing capacity of the firm to be important determinants of the
factor share response to openness. Finally, we identify domestic deregulation policies
and credit expansion as potential determinants of the observed decline in the labor
share.
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1 Introduction
The secular decline in the labor share since the 1980’s is a global phenomenon (Karabar-
bounis and Neiman (2014)), and a trend that is concurrent with large liberalization episodes
worldwide. It is therefore imperative to study how liberalization reforms – either through
lower barriers of trade or more open financial markets – might play a role in the determi-
nation of factor shares. Globalization – outsourcing in particular – has been brought forth
as a primary suspect for the decline in the labor share in developed countries (Elsby et al.,
2013). For developing countries it’s been argued that globalization can lower or raise the la-
bor share depending on the bargaining power of labor and price-to-cost margins (Ahsan and
Mitra, 2014; Kamal et al., 2015). However, openness can have very different implications for
factor shares in developing countries also due to under-developed financial markets and the
gap from the technological frontier. In this paper we uncover a new mechanism – access to
foreign capital – through which openness can have important distributional implications for
factor income. We show that trade openness and FDI liberalization can in fact have positive
implications for labor in a way that contrasts with the common perception in developed
countries.
To analyze the impact of openness on factor shares, we investigate an important liber-
alization episode of a developing country, that of India in the 1990’s, which has received
attention in the trade literature due to the size and unexpected nature of the reforms. In
1991 India passed several major regulatory reforms in response to a balance of payments
crisis that led to a severe recession, and a need to borrow from agencies such as the World
Bank and the IMF. The structural reforms included large reductions in import barriers, a
liberalization of foreign direct investment (FDI) policies, and industrial policy reforms such
as a reduction in the licensing requirements for capacity enhancements. A vast literature
has documented numerous outcomes that can be attributed to these reforms, which we sum-
marize below. We follow this literature in the construction of plausibly exogenous policy
shocks, which can be split into variations in output, input, and capital tariffs, in addition
to changes to the restrictiveness of FDI and licensing. We leverage these reforms, through
differential exposure across industries, to study the response of firm-level factor shares. Our
contribution is to apply a setting that allows us to identify a causal relationship to show how
improving firms’ access to foreign capital impacts relative factor shares.
In addition to providing robust evidence on the firm-level responses to openness reforms,
we present strong evidence for the mechanisms underlying our findings. Before describing
the regression specification and discussing the results, we clarify how reforms to reduce the
barriers to foreign capital can affect factor shares using a standard general equilibrium model.
1
The model features a production function that exhibits a constant elasticity of substitution
between labor and capital that comprises domestic and imported equipment. We follow the
framework of Raval (2018), which provides an intuitive expression to separate changes in
non-neutral factor productivity from changes in factor prices, and allows us to abstract from
changes in markups. To assess the impact of openness, we consider two changes through
which liberalization affects firm’s optimal decisions: a reduction in the tariffs on imported
capital goods, and an increase in the variety of foreign equipment available for use.1 The
former operates through a price channel by lowering the price of imported capital and its
rental rate. The latter, an increase in variety, raises the productivity of the capital stock, and
is propagated through a composition channel that triggers changes in the overall rental rate of
capital and the capital-to-labor factor productivity. These changes through the composition
channel do not necessarily move the labor share in the same direction. On the one hand,
the increase in the availability of different foreign capital types promotes capital-augmenting
technology as firms start using more sophisticated machinery. In the case where capital
and skill are complements – which we find to be the case for the firms in our sample – an
increase in the capital-augmenting technology raises the wage rate and the share of labor
in total income. On the other hand, the shift in the composition of capital towards more
sophisticated equipment can raise the rental rate of the total capital stock since the more
advanced capital goods are more expensive.2 We turn to the data to answer which channel
is more dominant.
To conduct the main empirical analysis, we use a panel data-set on Indian manufacturing
firms obtained from the Center for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) Prowess database
for the period from 1989 to 1997.3 We combine the firm level data with policy measures
of tariffs and industry regulations at the 3-digit national industry classification (NIC) level,
in addition to the industry-state measures of wages and other economic measures provided
by the Indian statistics agency (ASI). The firm data include total labor compensation, the
capital stock, and firm’s imports of capital. We construct rental rates at the industry level
using the input-output table, which allows us to construct payments to capital along with
payments to labor. As in Raval (2018), we consider the share of income paid to labor relative
1We focus on the reduction of capital tariffs in terms of openness reforms for illustration purposes and to
keep the model simple and tractable. One could extend the model to include a reduction in the barriers to
foreign multinationals that bring in their technology capital and influence the factor payments.
2As a way to support the potential channels highlighted in the theory, we provide a descriptive analysis
of capital imports to India during the liberalization period in Section 3.4. There is strong evidence of not
only a surge in the value of capital imports, but in the variety of high-technology products sourced from the
top technology-producing countries.
3This is the period when policy changes are most likely to be exogenous given the impetus for the reform
after the 1991 crisis.
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to the share paid to capital as our main measure of factor shares, although we show that
similar patterns hold also for the labor share of income. The identification of the policy
reforms’ effects on factor shares is possible due to the firms’ differential exposure to the
changes depending on the industry they operate in.
We investigate a broad set of policy reforms that were part of India’s early 1990s reforms
and that might influence factor shares. Contrary to what might be expected given the
reduction in the aggregate data, we find that trade reforms mostly raise the labor share in
India. When we examine the changes in tariffs by splitting up output, input, and capital
tariffs, we find that only a reduction in the capital tariff has a significant positive effect on
the share of labor in value added relative to the share of capital. The observed industry-
average reduction in effective capital tariffs raised the wage-to-capital expenditure ratio by
8.5 percentage points. There is also a significant impact from relaxing constraints on foreign
ownership, which can also be interpreted as an improvement in the access to foreign capital.
Similar to the results on the changes in capital tariffs, we find a statistically significant
increase in the wage-to-capital-expenditure ratio in response to FDI liberalization: a fully
liberalized industry has an average increase in the wage-to-capital expenditure ratio equal
to 11 percent. These results overturn the narrative that trade liberalization is a definite
mechanism through which labor loses its share of total income. We provide an intuitive
explanation for our finding: the reduction in trade barriers propels firms to shift towards
high-technology capital, which represents a labor-biased technical change that raises wages.
To make sense of the secular decline in the labor share, we point to some domestic policy
reforms that have had the opposite effect on factor shares. Measures that are not necessarily
related to openness, such as de-licensing and credit expansions, have negative effects on
the labor share. These results are consistent with the findings in the previous literature,
in particular with Aghion et al. (2008), who find that relaxing license requirements for
entry and capacity enhancements had a very large positive impact on economic growth in
India, and that this effect was especially significant in states that were “less pro-worker.”
Additionally, the adverse impact of credit expansion on the labor share is similar to the result
in Leblebicioglu and Weinberger (2017), who use a credit expansion episode in the United
States that provides causal evidence that labor share declined following state-by-state credit
banking deregulation. Taken all together, our findings show that the aggregate trends could
have been worse for labor if the deregulatory reforms in India had not included trade and
FDI liberalization.
As a way to test our proposed mechanism, we check whether the factor share responses to
changes in policy measures differ across types of firms. Most resoundingly, we find that the
rise of labor payments relative to capital payments is observed predominantly for importers.
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We also find the capital intensity, and the borrowing capacity of the firm (measured by the
debt-to-equity ratio) to be important determinants of the increase in the relative labor share.
Lastly, we show that the factor share response is larger among small/medium sized firms,
consistent with the reduction in barriers acting through the extensive margin of potential
capital importers. Using the intuition provided by our theoretical framework, we argue
that these characteristics point to the technology advantage of foreign capital in driving the
changes in the factor shares. The theoretical model suggests that firms employing imported
capital goods benefit from trade reform not only through a reduction in the price of goods
they are using but also through an improved access to a larger set of foreign equipment. The
increase in variety elevates the capital augmenting technology, which in turn leads to higher
wages. This is what we find when we examine the industry-level data: lower capital tariffs
raised the average wage rate and resulted in an increase in the payments to labor relative
to capital.4 Moreover, we find that the average rental rate of capital faced by industries
also increased, which shows that the change in the composition of capital towards more
sophisticated equipment boosted the payments to capital and negated the effects of price
reductions.
The estimates on the effects of FDI liberalization also support the capital-productivity
mechanism in influencing the factor shares. Once again we find that capital intensive firms
and those with higher debt-to-equity ratios raise payments to labor more relative to capital.
The results conform with the idea that the potential spillovers of FDI can be exploited only
by more technologically advanced firms, and that the lower tariffs are taken advantage of
relatively more by capital intensive firms. Finally, the loss to labor after de-licensing reforms
are concentrated among medium to large firms, which are the ones that can expand to a
more efficient size. They appear to do so through a larger demand for capital. Overall, our
results indicate that domestic policies to promote expansion of productive medium/large
sized firms play a role in the aggregate reduction of the share of payments to labor relative
to capital. However, the policies to promote foreign capital work to mitigate some of that
effect.
Related Literature This study fits within the strand of literature that explores the dif-
ferent mechanisms for the observed non-stability of factor shares, especially those that focus
on the trade angle. Elsby et al. (2013) conclude that globalization – more specifically off-
shoring – deserves most of the blame in the United States. Also focusing on the United
States, Oberfield and Raval (2014) find that the decline in the labor share originates from
4We only observe total labor payments in the firm-level data. Because we do not have information on
the number of workers, we cannot analyze the impact of reforms on the average wage rate at the firm-level.
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factors that affect technology, including automation and offshoring. For the case of develop-
ing countries, Ahsan and Mitra (2014) find that import competition – through its impact on
worker bargaining power – has a negative effect on the labor share for large firms. Kamal et
al. (2015) find that liberalization raises the labor share in China. The mechanisms in either
of these papers are very different than ours as they argue that workers receive a part of the
increasing rents. A recent study by Gupta and Helble (2018) also studies the labor share
in India as a response to trade reforms, however they study the period after liberalization
(1998 to 2007). Our paper explores a different channel since we concentrate on reforms that
reduce the barriers to foreign capital.5 Furceri and Loungani (2017) and Harrison (2005)
document a negative impact of capital account liberalization and trade on the labor share
for panels of developed and developing countries. A separate mechanism that focuses on the
growing role of capital in production is explored in Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014). In
that case the cost of capital decreases due to the lower price of investment goods. We focus
on foreign capital, obtained through imports or FDI, and allow for both non-neutral factor
productivity changes and changes in the rental rate of capital.
Our paper is also related to the literature on trade liberalization and inequality – see
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) for an early summary. In a study of regional inequality in
India, Topaloval (2010) tracks how inequality between rural and urban areas responds to
liberalization. She finds that localities with a higher exposure to import competition experi-
ence relatively lower reductions in the poverty rate.6 Our analysis differs in that we compare
across factors instead of across workers in different regions. A separate literature on inequal-
ity tracks the growing gap between types of workers, or the skill premium (Attanasio et al.,
2004; Burstein et al., 2013). The closest to this study is Raveh and Reshef (2016), which
finds that the composition of capital imports is important for explaining the skill premium
across workers. The type of inequality we study is across broader factors – labor and capital
– which has different implications for inequality. In fact, with a rise in capital productivity
wages rise unambiguously so all labor is better off, although our data does not allow us to
explore the composition within worker skill.
There is also an extensive literature on India’s trade liberalization. It is well established
that the trade liberalization increased productivity of Indian firms. Krishna and Mitra (1998)
and Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) link this to increased competition, although the latter
also highlights the importance of cheaper imported inputs. Goldberg et al. (2009) were the
5Kamal et al. (2015) extends their analysis until 2004. We restrict our sample to 1988-1997 to assure the
exogeneity of the reforms.
6This type of regional analysis has since been done in other developing and developed countries with
similar a similar interpretation of the results (Autor et al., 2013; Pierce and Schott, 2016; Hummels et al.,
2014; Dix-Carneiro and Kovak, 2017).
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first to document the rise in imported inputs in India. Our findings on factor shares can be
linked to productivity improvements because a rise in value added is not necessarily shared
equally across factors, nor does it have to be paid out to factors – De Loecker et al. (2016)
find that markups increased in response to trade reform in India. We find that the effect
on factor shares acts through capital-specific tariffs and not output and input tariffs, which
have been the focus of previous work on productivity improvements. However, capital tariffs
are embedded into the input tariffs in previous work. Relatedly, Bas and Berthou (2017)
and Kandilov et al. (2017) look at the decision to import capital goods and the investment
in foreign capital goods in India, respectively. The latter finds that investments in foreign
capital increase in response to a drop in capital tariffs, which is consistent with our findings
that Indian importers are the ones that raise their labor income share the most.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model that
illustrates how an increase in openness is a channel for varying factor income shares. In
section 3, we present the data that we use in our empirical analysis, describe the liberalization
episode, and provide a descriptive analysis of factor shares and capital imports in India. The
empirical specification, analysis, and results are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Openness and Factor Shares
In this section we consider a stylized model that motivates the relationship between factor
shares, foreign capital, and openness. It shares many features with the seminal papers in the
literature – e.g. Oberfield and Raval (2014) and Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) – but
is extended to differentiate between domestic and foreign capital used in production. The
model contains a final good, produced with a continuum of intermediate inputs, which can
be consumed or invested. We assume that the intermediate input firms combine labor with
domestic and foreign capital in order to produce their product. For illustration purposes and
to keep the model simple and tractable, we model foreign capital as imported goods. One
can extend the model to include foreign multinational firms that use their own technology
capital as in McGrattan and Prescott (2009). In what follows, we describe the problem
of the intermediate input producers, final good producers, and the households. Then, we
illustrate how the equilibrium factor shares depend on the price of the foreign capital goods,
in addition to the productivity embodied in the domestic and foreign capital goods. Finally,
we discuss how trade and FDI liberalization can affect the factor shares.
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2.1 Final Good Producers
We assume that there are perfectly competitive firms that purchase intermediate inputs from
a continuum of monopolistically competitive producers and combine the varieties z ∈ [0, 1]
with the following CES technology to produce the final good:
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
yt(z)
−1
 dz
) 
−1
, (1)
where yt(z) is the quantity of input z used in the production of the final good, and  > 1
denotes the elasticity of substitution between the inputs. The final good can be used as the
consumption good or the domestic investment good. Normalizing the price of the final good
to 1, and letting p(z) denote the price of input variety z, the demand for z can be written
as yt(z) = pt(z)
−Yt.
2.2 Intermediate Input Producers
The producer of the intermediate input variety z rents domestic (kdt (z)) and a set of foreign
capital ({kfjt (z)}j∈Ω) from the households and combines them with labor nt(z) using a con-
stant returns to scale technology to produce output, yt(z) = F
(
nt(z), k
d
t (z), {kft (z)}j∈Ω
)
.
The number of foreign capital varieties is determined by the size of the set Ω. Producer of
input z chooses labor, each type of capital and the price of its product in order to maximize
profits given by
∏
t
(z) = pt(z)yt(z)−Rdt kdt (z)−
∫
j∈Ω
Rfjt k
fj
t (z)dj −Wtnt(z) (2)
subject to
yt(z) = ct(z) + x
d
t (z) = pt(z)
− (Ct +Xdt ) , (3)
where Rdt and R
fj
t are the rental rates of domestic capital and foreign capital type j, and Wt
is the wage rate. The first order conditions yield the following demand equations for capital
and labor:
Rfjt =
1
µt
Ffjk,t(z)pt(z), ∀j ∈ Ω (4)
Rdt =
1
µt
Fdk,t(z)pt(z) (5)
Wt =
1
µt
Fn,t(z)pt(z), (6)
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where Ffjk, Fdk and Fn denote the marginal product of foreign capital type j, domestic
capital and labor, and µ = 
−1 is the mark-up that the firm charges over the factor prices.
2.3 Household
The representative household consumes the final consumption good, provides labor to the in-
termediate good producers, and accumulates domestic and foreign capital through purchases
of investment goods from domestic and foreign firms. The purchases of imported capital
goods are subject to a tariff, τ .7 The household receives dividends from the firms they own at
the end of each period. Additionally, the household holds an international bond Bt that pays
the world interest rate rt. The household chooses {Ct, Xdt , {Xfjt }j∈Ω, Kdt+1, {Kfjt+1}j∈Ω, Bt+1, nt(z)}
to maximize
U =
∞∑
t=0
ϕtU(Ct, Nt), (7)
subject to the capital accumulation equations Kfjt+1 = (1 − δ)Kfjt + Xfjt (∀j ∈ Ω), Kdt+1 =
(1− δ)Kdt +Xdt , and the budget constraint
Ct +X
d
t + τ
∫
j∈Ω
pfjXfjdjt +Bt+1 − (1 + rt)Bt =∫ 1
0
(
Wtnt(z) +
∫
j∈Ω
Rfjt k
fj
t (z)dj +R
d
t k
d
t (z) +
∏
t
(z)
)
dz + Λt, (8)
where ϕ denotes the discount factor; Xfjt denotes the imports of capital good type j; Λt is
the transfers from the intermediate good producers to the household; and aggregate labor
supply and and the aggregate capital stocks are given by Nt =
∫ 1
0
nt(z)dz, K
d
t =
∫ 1
0
kdt (z)dz
and Kfjt =
∫ 1
0
kfjt (z)dz, ∀j ∈ Ω.
2.4 Labor and Capital Share in Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the model is symmetric with pt(z) = Pt = 1, k
fj
t (z) = K
fj
t , k
d
t (z) = K
d
t ,
nt(z) = Nt, ct(z) = Ct, xt(z) = Xt, and yt(z) = Yt = F ({Kfjt }j∈Ω, Kdt , Nt). In order to
express the factor shares in terms of the parameters of the model, we adopt the following
CES production function for the intermediate input producers
Yt = F ({Kfjt }j∈Ω, Kdt , Nt) =
[
(1− η)
((
AKft K
f
t
)γ (
AKdt K
d
t
)1−γ)σ−1σ
+ η
(
ANt Nt
)σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
,
(9)
7For simplicity we assume that all foreign capital are subject to the same tariff rate.
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where σ denotes the elasticity of substitution between total capital and labor; η is the
distribution parameter determining the capital intensity in production; ANt is the labor
augmenting technology, and AKdt is the capital augmenting technology that is embodied in
the domestic capital goods. The effective composite foreign capital used in production is
given by
AKft K
f
t =
[∫
j∈Ω
(
Afjt K
fj
t
) θ−1
θ
dj
] θ
θ−1
(10)
where θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between different types of imported capital. With
this formulation, we are allowing labor and the overall capital to be substitutes (σ > 1) or
complements (σ < 1), but assuming that the domestic and foreign capital are imperfect
substitutes (elasticity of substitution equal to 1), with γ determining the share of foreign
capital in the overall capital used in production.
As in Oberfield and Raval (2014), we combine the equilibrium conditions with the in-
termediate good producers’ optimality conditions in (4), (5) and (6), and write the ratio of
labor share to capital share as8
sL,t
sK,t
=
WtNt
RdtK
d
t +
∫
j∈ΩR
fj
t K
fj
t dj
= Γ
(
Wt
ANt
)1−σ (
AKd
Rdt
)(1−γ)(1−σ)
Q
γ(1−σ)
t (11)
Qt =
∫
j∈Ω
(
Afjt
Rfjt
)θ−1
dj
 1θ−1 , (12)
where Q is an index of imported capital productivity-per-cost, and Γ is a constant.9
In this framework the impact of trade openness on relative labor share can be illustrated
with two changes, both of which operate through the index Qt: a reduction in the tariff
on foreign capital goods (τ) that would affect the rental rates Rfj, and an increase in the
number of imported capital varieties used in production, which implies an increase in the
size of Ω. The first change can be interpreted as a price effect on investment and raises
the productivity-cost index through lower cost of foreign capital. The second change alters
the composition of the capital stock and we interpret it as an enhancement of the capital-
augmenting technology through an increase in variety. We consider these two effects of
trade openness separately in the theory, although it is of course difficult to disentangle them
8Estimating the ratio of labor share to capital share allows us to identify the elasticity of substitution
between total capital and labor, σ, directly. Given the importance of this parameter in interpreting the
results, we choose to focus on the ratio between the labor and capital shares as opposed to just the labor
share.
9The expression for Γ is given by Γ =
(
η
1−η
)σ
(1− γ)(1−γ)(1−σ) γγ(1−σ).
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empirically. In the empirical analysis of section 4, the impacts of policy reforms on factor
shares reflect both changes, and therefore are interpreted as the combined effect.
Before demonstrating the impact of openness on factor shares through these two channels,
we can first show the general response of relative labor share to foreign capital’s productivity-
per-cost index, Q. To that end, we take the derivative of the log of relative labor share in
equation (11) with respect to the log of Q and obtain
∂ln
(
sL,t
sK,t
)
∂ln(Qt)
= (1− σ)∂ln(Wt)
∂ln(Qt)
+ γ(1− σ) = γ(1− σ)
[
1
θ − 1
sK,t
sL,t
+ 1
]
. (13)
The expression above shows that in addition to its direct impact, changes in Q affect factor
shares also through wages. As discussed in Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018), an increase in
capital augmenting technology raises the wage rate, which implies welfare gains for workers
aside from its distributional implications. Equation (13) also shows whether the labor share
increases or decreases relative to the capital share after an increase in Q depends on the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. If σ < 1, that is if labor and capital are
complements (which we show is true in the Indian data), then an increase in foreign capital
productivity-per-cost index Q will increase the labor share directly and indirectly by raising
the wage rate.10
To clarify the channels through which trade openness can affect factor shares through
changes in foreign capital’s productivity and/or cost, we first consider a trade liberalization
where the tariff on foreign capital is lowered, making it cheaper to invest in these goods.
For illustration purposes, let us assume that the productivity of foreign capital is the same
across the different varieties (Afj = AKf , ∀j), and that their prices are equal to each other
(pfj = pf ). The latter assumption implies that the rental rates of foreign capital goods are
also equal to each other, which allows us to simplify the foreign capital productivity-cost-ratio
index as
Qt =
AKf | Ω | 1θ−1
Rf
. (14)
From the household’s optimality conditions we have the following expressions for the rental
rates of foreign capital and domestic capital:
Rdt = rt + δ, (15)
Rft =
(
τpf
)
Rdt , (16)
10The data allows us to measure the effect on real wages at the industry level, and we do find a significant
rise in section 4.3. This provides a mechanism for the factor share responses we measure at the firm level.
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showing that a reduction in the tariff lowers the rental rate of foreign capital. Substituting
the expression for (16) in equation (14), it is straight-forward to see that lower tariffs imply
a higher productivity-per-cost (Q), and therefore a higher relative labor share as shown in
equation (13). Second, consider the impact of openness through the increase in the number
of foreign capital varieties used in production. As can be seen from equation (14), an
increase in the number of varieties (an increase in the size of Ω) increases the foreign capital
productivity-cost ratio index, which in turn increases the relative labor share.
In short, trade liberalization can increase labor share relative to capital share by low-
ering the rental rate of imported capital, and by enhancing capital-augmenting-technology
through an increase in the number of imported capital varieties.11 The results above could be
magnified or dampened if one considers the fact that a developing country like India needed
to import R&D intensive capital equipment goods in order to use them in production, and
trade liberalization transformed the composition of India’s capital to include more productive
foreign capital.12 Table 1 lists the top countries from which India imports capital. Over half
of India’s imports of capital come from the U.S. (20%), Japan (16%), and Germany (16%)
– technologically advanced countries. For this reason, we find it is plausible to interpret im-
ported capital as having an intrinsic efficiency advantage over domestic capital.13 On the one
hand, the compositional change toward foreign capital raises rental rates if foreign capital
is costlier, thus possibly dampens the price channel. However, an increase in the number of
varieties that embody a higher level of technology works to magnify the productivity effect
that raises Qt and leads to an unambiguous increase in real wages. Ultimately, the overall
response of relative factor shares becomes an empirical question.
[Table 1 about here.]
While the model we outlined mainly focuses on reductions in the tariffs that distort
the price of the imported capital goods, we argue that FDI liberalization can affect factor
shares through a similar mechanism of bringing in more efficient capital goods. As foreign
firms enter the domestic economy, they bring their technology capital, which can generate
an increase in the capital-augmenting technology, especially in developing countries. FDI
11In subsection 3.4 we show that the variety of foreign capital India imports indeed increased following
trade liberalization.
12Eaton and Kortum (2001) document that the production of R&D intensive capital equipment is con-
centrated in a few developed countries for the time period we are considering. Similarly, Caselli and Wilson
(2004) document large cross-country variation in investment across types of equipment.
13In the next section we also report the percentages of each type of capital goods India imported (Table 3).
These show that half of capital imports are Machinery (except Electrical), a category that embodies a high
level of technology.
11
can also improve the domestic firms’ productivity through spill-overs, as shown by a number
of studies. For example, Javorcik (2004) and Blalock and Gertler (2008) find productivity
spill-overs from FDI into downstream industries in Lithuania and Indonesia, respectively.
Using data from the U.S., Keller and Yeaple (2009) show substantial productivity gains from
horizontal FDI. Moreover, multinationals can also enhance aggregate productivity through
market reallocation and between firm selection (Alfaro and Chen (2015)).14 Firms’ factor
shares can respond to FDI through all of these mechanisms, since each of them could alter the
wages, cost of capital and the firms’ input choices. In our empirical analysis, we highlight the
channels through which FDI liberalization can facilitate the use of foreign capital, enhance
capital-augmenting technology, and thereby alter the relative factor shares.
3 Data and Descriptive Analysis
India during the late 1980’s and 1990’s constitutes a great case for studying the role of
openness on factor shares because the removal of the highly restrictive trade and foreign
investment policies provides exogenous policy “shocks”. Prior to the late 1980’s, India
utilized a variety of restrictive policies. On the trade side, high tariff and nontariff barriers
severely restricted imports of final goods, intermediate inputs, and capital goods. India
also restricted imports of inputs in specific industries and discouraged foreign ownership in
most industries. Changes in the regulatory regime are discussed in much of the previous
literature cited in the introduction, and summarized in Sivadasan (2006). Therefore, in the
next subsection we mostly describe the construction of the openness measures and report
the summary statistics for all the policy measures. It is also worth noting that studying
the case of India brings with it the advantage of availability of data from various sources
to measure the changes in the structure of the economy in response to these reforms. In
the following subsections we describe the industry and firm level data that we use in the
empirical analysis and show the evolution of factor shares in India during the liberalization
episode. We end with a descriptive analysis of India’s capital imports during this time, as a
motivation for the theoretical mechanisms described above.
3.1 Background and Data on the Liberalization Episode
Before the liberalization in the 1990’s, India’s economy was characterized by high tariff and
non-tariff barriers on imports, as well as restrictions on foreign investment. Following the
14Using a cross-country firm-level panel dataset, Alfaro and Chen (2015) show that the latter mechanism
account for the majority of the productivity gains.
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standby arrangement with the IMF, which ensued the balance of payment crisis in 1991,
India launched a structural adjustment program and commenced liberalizing its economy.
As part of the reforms, the levels and dispersions of tariffs on imports were lowered, and the
industries gradually opened up for foreign investment. Since the timing and the magnitude
of the reforms were heterogeneous across industries, we utilize the variation in the tariff
measures and the FDI liberalization indicator to identify the effects of openness on firm-
level factor shares. Goyal (1996) describes the reforms as “shock therapy” designed to
minimize opposition. Moreover, previous papers have convincingly argued that the reforms
came mostly as a surprise. For example, using data from the Annual Survey of Industry and
focusing on a range of industry characteristics such as employment, wages and average factory
size, Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) check the endogeneity of the changes in tariffs between
1987 and 1997 across industries. They find no correlation between tariff reductions and pre-
reform (1987) industry characteristics. However, they show that in the years after 1997,
tariff cuts may have been more selective to protect less efficient industries. Following their
findings, we also confine our study to the pre-1997 period.15 The fact that policy changes
are uncorrelated with pre-reform firm characteristics that determine factor shares relieves
potential omitted variable problems, though we check these in more detail in Section 4.
We obtain the information on some of the main policy measures, namely the output tariffs
plus indices of industry and investment liberalization, to construct our own measures of
interest from Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) . We aggregate the indices and output tariffs
from their study to the 3-digit 1987 NIC level aggregation to construct all our measures.16
Most importantly, we split tariffs into output, input, and capital tariffs. Although it is
common to split tariffs between output and input tariffs, for our purposes it also necessary
to split input tariffs so that the effect on intermediate inputs and capital goods can be
separated.17 We then make use of the 1993-1994 input-output table to produce capital and
input (intermediate) tariffs, following their classification of capital goods and intermediate
inputs. Our construction of these tariffs follows:
capitaltariffjt =
∑
s
αjsoutputtariffst, (17)
15Some of the other papers that argue the exogeneity of the policy changes before 1997, and limit the
sample to pre-1997 are Goldberg et al. (2009), and De Loecker et al. (2016).
16Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) use a mix of 4 to 5 digit policy measures. However, because we carry out
some of our empirical analysis at the 3-digit industry level using data from the Annual Survey of Industries,
we aggregate the tariff measures to the 3-digit level to be able to use the same measures consistently through
out the paper.
17Kandilov et al. (2017) also distinguishes between the intermediate input tariffs and capital goods tariffs
to study the impact of trade liberalization in India on the investment decisions of firms.
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where αjs is the share of the capital input s (an element in the set of inputs classified as
capital goods) in total input costs (capital plus intermediate). We construct the intermediate
input tariffs the same way, this time using the set of intermediate inputs. Thus, the sum
of capital and input tariffs produces an input tariff that is more commonly found in the
literature (Amiti and Konings, 2007). Notice that the effective capital tariffs we construct
seem relatively low because the sum of the IO coefficients is smaller for capital inputs –
we sum over a smaller number of inputs (see Table 2). A better sense of the changes in
capital tariffs is provided in Table 3, which summarizes the categories of capital imports
between 1990 and 1997. For example, consider the 55 percentage reduction in the tariff on
Machinery, which dropped from 76 to 21 percent. This change would have affected industries
differently depending on their reliance on machinery. In an industry where machinery makes
up 5% of total input costs, the effective capital tariff reduction would have been small at
2.75 percentage points. On the other hand, in an industry where machinery makes up 50%
of total input costs, the drop in effective capital tariffs would have been more substantial at
27.5 percentage points. The same intuition can be used for inputs tariffs.18
Table 2 reports the average and standard deviation of three types of tariffs between 1989
and 1998. The output tariffs statistics line up very closely with Topalova and Khandelwal
(2011) since we take these from their study (with the very slight differences being due to
the aggregation from 4-5 digit to 3 digit codes). For all three types of tariffs, the mean
and standard deviations start to decrease rapidly starting in 1993. The literature on firm
productivity has highlighted the importance of the reduction in output and input tariffs:
the former to raise competition and the latter to bring in imported inputs. By splitting up
intermediate inputs and capital goods in the input-output table, we show that capital tariffs
were also reduced significantly (by more than half) during this period.19 It is important
to note that, as is the case with output and input tariffs, the reduction in capital tariffs is
industry specific. We find that the industry with the biggest decline in its effective capital
tariffs saw a 23 percentage point reduction, while on the other side of the spectrum the
smallest decline for an industry was close to 0.
We also report a measure of FDI liberalization and a “Delicensing” index, both taken from
more disaggregated data in Topaloval (2010). For the FDI measure, a liberalized industry
takes the value of 1 if it is in the list of industries with automatic permission for 51 percent
18We differ slightly from Topalova and Khandelwal (2011), who use the value of an input relative to the
output value. Therefore, their input tariffs are slightly smaller. Results using the input as a share of total
value are very similar, but with a smaller level of input and capital tariffs.
19Studies that also make this point include Bas and Berthou (2017) and Kandilov et al. (2017).
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foreign equity share at time t.20 Similar to the tariff measures, we aggregate the FDI measure
to the 3-digit level. An increase in the index signifies an increase in FDI liberalization in
that industry. Before the reforms, a license was also required to establish a plant, introduce
a new product and expand capacity. Through annual allotments of inputs and import
licenses the government controlled the flow of inputs such as steel and fuel, as well as the
licenses to purchase machinery. The “delicensing” measure aims to capture the changes in
these licensing requirements. It is an indicator equal to one if the industry is subject to
licensing requirements for entry and capacity enhancements, and a reduction in this index
signals greater “delicensing”. Table 2 reports that the measure of FDI liberalization starts
to increase in 1992, after the passage of the new industrial policies. In the same year, the
decrease in the “Delicensing” index signifies a reduction in the licensing requirements.
[Table 2 about here.]
[Table 3 about here.]
3.2 Firm and Industry Data
CMIE Prowess Data The data on the panel of Indian firms are collected by the Centre
for Monitoring of the Indian Economy (CMIE), and made available by Prowess. The firms
in the data-set account for about 70 percent of the organized industrial activity. In addition
to the variables we need to construct the factor shares (capital stock and the total wage bill),
the data also contain information on additional features, such as imports, foreign ownership
status, and R&D spending, which allow us to analyze heterogeneity of the impact of openness
on the factor shares.
To construct the fraction of labor share to capital share ( sL
sK
), we take the ratio of total
employee compensation to total payments to capital.21 Calculating the total payments to
capital requires us to bring in new data, as we are not aware of another study that has
constructed wage-to-capital payment ratios for India. Capital expenditure is the product
of a firm’s capital (gross fixed assets) with a measure of the rental rate of capital. In
20Topaloval (2010) collects data on openness from The Handbook of Indian Statistics.
21Alternatively, one can also construct labor shares as the ratio total employee compensation by the value
added, where value added is constructed by subtracting total costs (total intermediate costs plus total energy
costs) from the value of sales and adding the change in the stock of finished and semi-finished goods. Our
ratio does not require the construction of value added.
15
constructing the rental rate, we follow Oberfield and Raval (2014) and use the following
formula:
Rjt = (Pjt−1rt + δjtPjt) /(1− taxt), (18)
where r denotes the real interest rate (source: Reserve Bank of India), and tax is the corpo-
rate tax rate for India (source: World Tax Database, University of Michigan). The variable
Pjt is the capital price index for industry j. Deflators are available for construction and
machinery, so we construct a weighted average of the deflators based on the IO coefficients
for construction and machinery in each of the 3-digit NIC industries. The depreciation rate
(δjt) is also 3-digit industry specific. We use the ratio of total depreciation costs to the
stock of fixed assets, each available at the industry-state level from the Annual Survey of
Industries.
Industry-State Data The Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) data is made available by
the Indian Ministry of Statistics, and covers the liberalization period over 1988-1997. It
provides comprehensive data on the industrial sector, which is mostly manufacturing plus
repair services, gas and water supply and cold storage. The Survey is conducted annually,
and covers all factories registered under the Factories Act of 1948, which are defined as those
factories employing 10 or more workers using power, and those employing 20 or more workers
without using power. We use the ASI data that are at the state-3 digit (NIC 1987)-year level,
with measures such as total value added, gross fixed capital, value of depreciated capital, and
total labor compensation. Since the firm level data come from a subset of firms as provided
by Prowess, the ASI data allow us to construct aggregate measures at the manufacturing
level. The ASI data-set also provides useful variables not available in the firm data, such
as the depreciation rate described above. Most importantly, it provides information on
number of workers and total compensation, which we use to construct average wages at the
industry-state level.
3.3 Factor Shares
Before we discuss our empirical results on how openness can impact factor shares within
firms, we present some statistics on the evolution of aggregate factor shares in India during
our sample period. We stress that this paper mainly aims to explore firm responses to
specific trade reforms, so we present these aggregate factor shares merely to give a sense
of the context through which we interpret the empirical results. Furthermore, although
we mostly use relative factor shares as the outcome in the regression specifications, in this
section we also show the time series of labor and capital shares (relative to value added) to
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confirm they display similar patterns. Note that our main results are based on the firm level
data from CMIE – which covers approximately 70% of industrial activity. For this reason,
we first present factor shares using aggregate data from KLEMS and ASI, and then confirm
that the same patterns hold in the firm-level data we employ in our empirical analysis.
Factor Shares at the Industry Level Figure 1 reports the aggregate labor and capital
shares (relative to value added) in the manufacturing sector based on the ASI data. We
aggregate total factor compensation and value added in each industry across states to get
industry factor shares, and then report the unweighted average.22 To construct the capital
share, we use the information on the stock of fixed capital (gross and net of depreciation)
provided in the ASI data, and combine it with our estimated rental rate of capital (described
above) to construct capital expenditures.
Figure 1 depicts a decline in the labor share and an increase in the capital share over
the 1988-1997 period. Aggregate labor share drops around 20 percent, while the capital
share shows a secular climb that is concurrent to the labor share decline. There is slightly
more variation in the capital share, partly due to the changes in the interest rate, as the
real rate in India (reported by the Indian Central Bank) spikes in 1992.23 We observe a
similar downward trend in the labor share in the measure constructed with the KLEMS
data. We relegate the description of KLEMS dataset and the time series of factor shares
to the appendix, but we point out some minor differences here. The ASI data are reported
in each fiscal year, so that for example, year 1988 refers to the 1988-1989 fiscal year. For
this reason, the variation might differ slightly from the KLEMS data. The level of the
manufacturing labor share constructed using the ASI data varies from 36% in 1988 to 27.5%
in 1997, which on average is 10 percentage points lower than the labor share calculated
using the KLEMS data. The difference might be due to the fact that the ASI data exclude
firms with less than 10 employees and these small firms tend to be more labor-intensive.
Nevertheless, the pattern in the labor share fits with the KLEMS data.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Figure 2 reports the time series of the compensation of labor relative to capital expen-
ditures, which we report for the manufacturing sector as a whole. Relative factor shares
22We have also calculated factor shares at the manufacturing sector as a whole by aggregating observations
for each state-industry per year. We present only the unweighted measures, as we do not find any different
trends across industries. A decomposition of the labor share (not reported) would show that, similar to what
has been documented in other countries, the factor share trends are within-industry, i.e., the reduction in
the labor share in India is due to within-industry declines.
23However, the variation in the Indian interest rate does not affect our empirical results, since it is an
aggregate picked up by year fixed effects.
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eliminate the markup component that exists in the labor share of value added. Consistent
with the previous graph, the figure shows that the ratio of labor compensation to capital
expenditures has also experienced a steady decline throughout this period. Given the diffi-
culties that arise when computing Rjt, we compare the benchmark relative factor share with
one where the rental rate is assumed fixed over time. This comparison leads to a slightly
more stable relative factor share, but displays a very similar pattern.24 We therefore con-
clude that the decline in the labor share is consistent with capital income growing faster
than labor income, and is not merely a reflection of increases in markups or other changes
that move capital and labor income equally during this time.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Factor Shares with the Firm Data To check how close the factor shares in the CMIE
data track the industry level trends, we also construct the time series of factor shares using
the sample of firms in the CMIE data. As in the comparison between the ASI and the
KLEMS data, the levels of labor share in value added are even smaller in the firm data.
Figure 3 shows that the aggregate labor share is below 15%, which is much lower than the
labor share calculated using the already aggregated data.25 Even more extreme than the
ASI data, which do not account for firms with less than 10 workers, the CMIE data provide
information on a selection of even larger firms. This selection seems to collect firms with
small labor shares. However, the trends found above with the aggregate data are still present
as the labor share declines throughout the sample. Therefore, the changes in the factor shares
of firms within the selected sample still represent the dynamics in the labor share observed
in the economy overall. A similar picture emerges for the labor-to-capital expenditure ratios
(Figure 4). The level is lower as this selection of firms are more capital intensive, but a
reduction in this ratio can be seen when comparing the pre-1992 period average with the
latter period.
We emphasize that this study does not aim to explain the overall trend in the labor
share – in fact we find the trade reforms mostly raised the labor share, a response that goes
against the aggregate trend. Our aim is to compare the relative factor share responses of firms
differentially exposed to trade reforms. To complement the firm-level results, in Section 4.3
we estimate the main specification using industry-level ASI data in order to check how the
24We have checked that the results presented in the next section are robust to calculating factor shares
with fixed rental rates.
25Ahsan and Mitra (2014) report very similar labor share numbers. This could point to a problem in the
construction of value added, one reason we prefer our relative factor shares measure.
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selection of firms in CMIE affects our results. Moreover, the aggregate estimates also reflect
the reallocation across firms in response to openness that might negate some of the average
within-firm changes. When compared to the results obtained with the CMIE data, changes in
the capital tariffs have almost the same impact on aggregate relative factor shares. However,
the rise in the labor share due to the FDI liberalization disappears in the ASI data, which
likely speaks to the reallocation across firms negating the within-firm effects. We discuss
these issues in detail at the end of the results section.
[Figure 3 about here.]
[Figure 4 about here.]
3.4 Descriptive Analysis of India’s Capital Imports
In this subsection we present a descriptive analysis of capital imports for India during the
trade liberalization period. This analysis provides preliminary evidence for the theoretical
mechanism that was introduced in the previous section, which we argue drives our main
results in the next section. Our structural model points towards two channels that impact
relative factor shares: the price channel through cheaper capital imports, and the capital
productivity channel through an increase in the variety of capital goods, as well as the change
in the composition of the capital stock towards foreign technology. Next, we present data
describing the compositional changes in India’s capital following the liberalization, and show
that India increased its capital imports substantially from the top capital exporters. We also
provide suggestive evidence that India raised its imports of “high-tech” goods as classified
in the trade data.
In the first set of analysis, we use detailed trade data from the UN Comtrade to study
the level and the variety of India’s capital imports. We focus our attention on imports from
the top 10 trade partners listed in Table 1, which are high-technology-producing countries.26
The import data is reported by the 6 digit HS codes, which we define as products. We keep
only capital goods, as classified given the US Census end-use classification. Figure 5 reports
the time series of total value of capital imports, as well as the number of unique capital
goods imported to India as a measure of variety. As expected, the total value of capital
imports drops prior to 1992, concurrent with the crisis in India. Although imports rebound
26These countries are: United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Switzerland, South Korea,
Singapore, Japan, Italy, and Taiwan. Since we do not have data for Taiwan individually, we use imports
from China instead.
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in 1992 to 1990 levels (less than 300 million US dollars), it is clear that the largest gains
in terms of value of imports (left axis) occur between 1993 and 1995, to above 500 million
dollars. Importantly, this pattern is matched by the variety of products imported. We count
a “variety” as a unique HS6 good-origin country combination, using a common definition
in the literature that interprets a product from two different origins as two unique varieties
(Gopinath and Neiman, 2014).27 Table 4 shows that the number of varieties increases from
each of the top 10 capital-exporting-trade partners. It is once again clear that India has the
largest increase in the number of varieties between 1993 and 1995. The trend in the trade
data is therefore consistent with a rise in the productivity aspect of the productivity-per-cost
index, Qt defined in equation (14), which increases due to an increase in variety, and this
effect gets magnified by the rise in capital imports from the top technology exporters.
[Figure 5 about here.]
[Table 4 about here.]
As a second piece of evidence that suggests a rise in Indian capital productivity in response
to liberalization, we present an analysis of exports by the United States that are classified
as “advanced technology products” (ATP). We limit the analysis to U.S. exports due to the
availability of detailed (HTS 10 digit code) export data provided by Schott (2008). This
level of disaggregation is consistent with the classification of ATP products. Conditioning
on ATP exports by the United States between 1989 and 1998, we estimate the following
difference-in-difference specification:
ln(Xdt) = αd + αt + αPostLib ∗ Indiadt + ζdt, (19)
with the outcome measure being log exports by destination (d) and year (t). The coefficient
of interest is on the interaction variable PostLib∗India, a product of a dummy equal to 1 for
the years post Indian-liberalization and a dummy equal to 1 for exports to India. Exports
are aggregated to destination-year observations within ATP products, so we control for
destination and year fixed effects. The question of interest is whether within ATP products
27We find a similar pattern if we count a unique variety as an HS product from any origin. When
constructing the measure of variety in Figure 5, we eliminate imports from China and Germany. China is
used as a proxy for Taiwan, but includes an extreme jump in the number of goods exported in 1992. German
data is only available starting in 1991. Including these countries could affect the interpretation of the count
across years; therefore, we do not include them in the measure. Lastly, we should point out that there exists
the possibility of an upward bias in the number of variety counts during the revision years of HS codes (1992
and 1996), although we use a consistent classification. However, the qualitative interpretation is not affected
if we were to eliminate the increase in the number of products in those years.
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export flows to India grew especially fast after 1993, relative to the rest of the world. Table 5
presents results for various variations of (19), each consistent with a surge of ATP exports
to India after 1993.28 The first two columns present the main specification, altering the
first year of PostLib from 1993 to 1994. It is clear that relative to the period before Indian
liberalization, there is a large increase of U.S. exports of ATP products to India compared
to other destinations. In the next column we exclude the observations from 1992 due to the
large drop in exports to India during the year following the crisis. We find that our results
are robust, and the recovery from the crisis is not driving the results. Finally, in the last
specification we change the outcome measure to the number of high-tech products exported
to each destination (where the product is a 10-digit good). Consistent with Figure 5, we
find that India imported a significantly larger amount of ATP products from the U.S. after
the liberalization.
[Table 5 about here.]
To summarize, there is very strong evidence of a surge in Indian capital imports after its
liberalization. This growth is associated with a larger variety of capital good imports coming
from the top-technology producing countries. Evidence from U.S. export data also suggests
that the surge in capital imports includes products classified as high-technology. In the
next section we estimate the reduced form effects of the openness policy reforms on relative
factor shares, and argue that the evidence provided in this subsection with import data
corroborates with capital productivity channel being the main driver for these effects.
4 Empirical Results
In order to identify the effects of trade and FDI policies on the relative factor shares, we
formulate our main empirical equation as follows:
ln
(
sLijst
sKijst
)
= αi + αst + βReformjt + ijst, (20)
where the subscripts denote firms (i), 3-digit NIC industries (j), states (s), and years (t). We
use Reformjt to describe the policy measures of interest, the three types of tariff measures
and the FDI liberalization indicator, as well as the delicensing indicator. The vector of
coefficients β capture the net response of factor shares to changes in these policy measures;
28We also ran a similar specification with product-destination-year observations, and estimated the same
coefficient but as an average across products. The results are consistent with a surge in exports of ATP
products to India post 1993.
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that is, they show the combined impact of liberalization on the relative factor shares through
the capital cost and productivity channels described in the previous sections. We include a
set of fixed effects, which contain firm fixed effects (αi) that allow us to control for time-
invariant unobservable firm characteristics, and a set of state-year interaction fixed effects
(αst) to control for all aggregate shocks at the state level. In the main specification, we utilize
within-firm and within-state-year variation, although we also report results that eliminate
state-year fixed effects in favor of just year fixed effects. Finally, in all cases we cluster
standard errors at the 3-digit NIC industry level.
As demonstrated in section 2, how factor shares respond to openness through various
channels depends on the complementarity or the substitutability between capital and labor.
Before reporting the main results, we show that, consistent with most other firm-level stud-
ies, capital and labor are complements in the Indian firm-level data. We can obtain the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in our data by estimating the coefficient
on wages jointly with the responses to liberalization reforms using the within firm, over-time
variation in equation (20).29 However, this estimation strategy would expose us to a poten-
tial endogeneity bias in σ, since wages might be changing with the concurrent liberalization
reforms in our sample. Therefore, we adopt the strategy in Oberfield and Raval (2014)
and utilize the cross-sectional variation in wages across states to obtain an estimate of the
elasticity.30 We estimate the following specification:
ln
(
sLijst
sKijst
)
= αjt + (1− σ)ln
(
WageASIjst
)
+ FirmControlsijst + ηijst. (21)
Firm controls above include dummies for exporters and importers (of both capital and inter-
mediates), plus the firm markup and debt to equity ratio. In this case, industry-year fixed
effects (αjt) capture all industry specific shocks, including the trade and FDI policy changes.
Results are reported in Table 6, where we complement the pooled regression for the full
sample with regressions using single years of data (before and after the reforms). In all
cases, the coefficient on the wage rate is positive and less than one, yielding a value for the
capital-labor substitution parameter that is below one. Hence, consistent with most other
firm-level studies, we find that labor and capital are complements.31 In the rest of the paper,
29If we log-linearize equation (11) in the structural model, the coefficient in front of the wage rate would
be (1 − σ). In that case, we can interpret equation (20), augmented with wages, as a linear approximation
of the equilibrium relative factor shares, and use the coefficient on the wage rate to interpret the elasticity
of substitution.
30Oberfield and Raval (2014) identify the elasticity parameter with variation in wages across the U.S.
metro areas, estimated separately for each year.
31Oberfield and Raval (2014) report an estimate of 0.7 for the US manufacturing sector, 0.84 for Colombia
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we base the interpretations of our findings on this complementarity result. Also, in the next
subsection, we show that our results remain unaltered if we include the wage rate in the
main specification that relies on within-firm variation to estimate the impact of openness on
factor shares.
[Table 6 about here.]
4.1 Main results
The results for the main specification in equation (20) are reported in Table 7, with the
firm relative factor share (log of wage-to-capital expenditure ratio) as the outcome. We first
show the results for a specification that only includes the trade policy measures (tariffs),
then show the impact of the FDI policy measure by itself. We then pool these together to
reassure the reader that the results are not driven by the inclusion or the exclusion of certain
policy measures.
The first column includes tariffs as the only policy changes, and it provides evidence that
neither the output nor the intermediate input tariffs have any significant effect on the relative
factor shares. Therefore, we drop these from the analysis going forward.32 The strongest
effect is estimated for the tariff on capital goods: a lower tariff on capital goods significantly
increases the wage-to-capital-expenditure ratio. We can interpret this result through the lens
of the theoretical analysis in section 2 as follows. A reduction in the tariff on capital goods
raises the productivity-per-cost of foreign capital (Qt), and given that labor and capital
are complements in the data (σ < 1), this improvement in the productivity-cost index of
foreign capital increases the fraction of income going to labor relative to capital. Below, we
investigate this mechanism more in detail by looking at firm characteristics, as well as the
factor prices themselves. Before we quantify this impact, notice that the capital tariff rates
that we construct are “effective” rates. That is, we calculate the weighted average of tariffs
on capital goods that are used by an industry, where the weights are determined by the
share of a particular capital good in total input costs. To illustrate the point, consider a 10
percentage point reduction in electrical computing and accounting machinery (see Table 3 for
the capital good categories). If electrical computing and accounting machinery make up 10%
and Chile. Using data for 2001-2003, they estimate an average plant level estimate of 0.53 in India and
calculate an aggregate elasticity of 1.11 for the whole manufacturing sector, where the greater heterogeneity
in capital intensities account for about 70% of the overall elasticity. Our estimate for σ is the average at the
firm level (without giving higher shares to larger firms) obtained for the 1990-1998 period, and it is within
the range of their findings.
32All the results are almost identical with and without including these tariffs, so they do not seem to have
any effect on factor shares.
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of a particular industry’s total inputs, this industry would experience a 1 percentage point
reduction in its effective capital tariff rate (assuming all other tariffs remain the same). For
an industry where these types of machinery make up 50% of total input costs, the effective
capital tariff rates would change by 5 percentage points. The coefficient on capital tariffs
show that a 1 percentage point decline in the effective capital tariffs raises the relative labor
share by 1.7 percent. Hence, the 5 percentage point average effective capital tariff rate
reduction between 1989 and 1998 shown in Table 2 implies a 8.5 percent increase in factor
payments to relative payments to capital.
[Table 7 about here.]
In column (2), we consider the impact of FDI liberalization on the relative factor shares.
An increase in “FDI Liberalization” signifies a reduction in the barriers to foreign direct
investment, and can be interpreted as an improvement in the access to foreign capital.
Similar to the results on the changes in capital tariffs, we find a statistically significant
increase in the wage-to-capital-expenditure ratio in response to FDI liberalization. A fully
treated industry whose FDI measure increases from 0 to 1 is expected to see a 11.3 percent
increase in its wage-to-capital-expenditure ratio. One way to interpret this result is to
think of FDI openness as an increase in the availability and variety of foreign capital in
total production (an increase in Ω in our theoretical model, see equation (13)). As foreign
firms enter India, they bring their technology capital, which then implies an increase in the
capital-augmenting technology (McGrattan and Prescott (2009)). Since labor and capital
are complements, given an improvement in the capital-augmenting technology relative to
labor-augmenting technology, firms respond by hiring more labor leading to an increase in
the labor’s share relative to capital’s share of income.
The specification in column (2) also includes “Delicensing”, which captures a concurrent
policy change during the restructuring in India. Previous literature has found that relaxing
license requirements for entry and capacity enhancements had a very large positive impact
on economic growth (Aghion et al., 2008), and that the effect was especially stronger in
states that are “less pro-worker”. In the context of factor shares, we find that the reduction
of licensing requirements (a decrease in the delicensing index) lowered the relative share
of labor. These results suggest that the delicensing reform, which lowered the share of
products in an industry subject to licensing requirements, made it easier for firms to invest
and increased the overall use of capital. Hence, by increasing the total income earned by
capital relatively more than the income earned by labor, this policy change contributed to
the decline in the labor share observed in the data.
When we include capital tariffs along with FDI liberalization and delicensing in column
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(3), the coefficient on capital tariffs is very similar to the one in column (1), but the impact of
FDI declines slightly and becomes significant only at the 10% level.33 Using the coefficients
from this specification, we can obtain a rough estimate of the total impact of the removal of
restrictions to foreign capital in India between 1989 and 1998. Combining the impact of the
5 percentage point decline in the effective capital tariff rates with the FDI liberalization (an
increase of the index from 0 to 0.45, see Table 2), we obtain a total increase in the relative
labor share of 12 percent. In our sample the labor share declines by 46 percent relative
to the capital’s share (the ratio of labor to capital expenditures decreases from 1.057 to
0.57). These two numbers are not directly comparable since the latter includes across firm
reallocation while our estimation captures within-firm changes in factor shares. Still, relating
the two numbers provides a perspective for the magnitude of the effect of globalization. In
subsection 4.3, we present a more aggregate analysis that captures the reallocation effects in
addition to the within firm changes in relative factor shares.
In column (4), we show that the results remain robust to including state-industry wages
in the specification. The policy reforms’ impacts are almost identical to the ones in the
previous column, and the coefficient on wages is less than one, consistent with the comple-
mentarity between capital and labor. In the fifth column, we add credit to GDP ratio to
the specification in column (3). This variable, which captures the credit conditions in each
state, varies at the state-year level; therefore, we use separate firm, state, and year fixed
effects, and exclude the state-year interaction effects.34 The negative coefficient (significant
at the 10% level) shows that increases in total credit, lowered the relative share of labor.
This result suggests that improvements in the availability of credit allowed the firms in India
to invest more in physical capital, and unlike the reforms related to openness, contributed
to the decline in the labor share observed in India.35 Since the credit data is available at
the state-level rather than state-industry level, we cannot include it in our more general
specification with state-year interaction effects. Controlling for aggregate shocks at the state
level is potentially important, so in the rest of the analysis we adopt the specification in
column (3) as our baseline, and present the results omitting (but implicitly controlling for)
state credit.
33In the appendix, we show that there is a strong correlation between industries that lower capital and
input tariffs, and also liberalize FDI.
34We also re-ran the specification in column (3) with this set of separate fixed effects, and the results are
almost identical.
35These reforms are consistent with a relaxation of capital constraints and do not reflect the shocks to
openness we explore in the theory. These results also line up with our findings in Leblebicioglu and Wein-
berger (2017), where banking deregulation across the U.S. states led to lower loan yields and improvements
in the availability of credit in the U.S. and thereby contributed to the decline in the labor share.
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Our main outcome measure assumes that labor and capital only get paid through their
factor payments, and the impact of mark-ups on labor-share and the capital-share cancel
out. However, it is plausible that firm profits get paid fully to capital owners, increasing
capital’s share of total income. To address this measurement issue and to show that labor’s
share of value added displays similar responses to the policy changes we obtained for relative
factor shares, in Table 8 we consider two alternative measures of labor share. In doing so,
we lose some observations in the calculation of the alternative measures. For this reason, in
column (1) we repeat the baseline specification of the previous table (column (3) in Table 7),
and show that the change in the sample does not significantly affect the results. The first
alternative measure we consider, presented in column (2) of Table 8, adjusts for firm’s markup
in the share of labor in factor payments, and is calculated as sLit =
1
µit
WitNit
WitNit+RitKit
, where µit
is the estimated firm markup.36 The second measure is the simple fraction of labor payments
to value added. Additionally, in the last column we look at the impact of the policy changes
on firm’s mark-up. Columns (2) and (3) show a statistically and economically significant
increase in the labor share in response to a reduction in capital tariffs. The last column
suggests that mark-ups might have also increased, although this impact is not statistically
significant. These results are consistent with De Loecker et al. (2016), who find that firms
pass-through a part of cost reductions into markups. Still, we find that labor did benefit from
trade liberalization and the changes in firm mark-ups did not wipe out the gain in labor’s
factor share.37 The results for FDI liberalization display a similar picture, however, only its
impact on mark-up adjusted labor share is statistically significant. Finally, the results in
Table 8 once again show that the removal of the licensing requirements hurt labor, causing
its share (in both mark-up adjusted and unadjusted terms) in income to decline.
[Table 8 about here.]
Robustness The analysis above leverages annual changes in tariffs and the liberalization
policies at the industry level to identify the impact of openness on the relative factor shares.
This is a reasonable specification since the reductions in the tariffs and the removal of the
restrictions on FDI were staggered over time, and therefore we can utilize the annual variation
36This expression for the labor share is obtained by combining the firm’s first order conditions in (4), (5),
and (6) with the expression for aggregate output in (9). As a markup measure, we use a simple price-cost
margin: Y−WN−RK−IntermY . The median markup is 18%. We also constructed markups using the DeLoecker
and Warzynski (2012) method with similar results.
37For example, take the ratio of labor payments to value added (column (3)): a 5 percentage point
reduction in the effective capital tariff leads is associated with a 3 percent increase in the labor share, which
is economically important.
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in the policy variables for identification. However, there might be concerns about expected
policy changes affecting factor shares before the reform is implemented. Additionally, it
might not obvious when the policy reforms affect the outcome variable. To alleviate these
concerns, we consider a long-differences specification, where we use the difference in the policy
and outcome measures between the 1989-1990 fiscal year and the 1997-1998 fiscal year. As
such, we compute the total reduction in the tariff measures between these years. Since we
also take the difference in the firm outcomes over these years, we are left with a sample of
firms that survive over the 8 years. For this reason, the number of firms drops to 1,052 from
3,576 firms. In Table 9 we replicate the first three columns of Table 7 using a cross-section
of long-differences. The results are similar to the baseline specification. Relative labor share
increases in response to more liberalized FDI policies and lower capital tariffs, although
only the latter impact is significantly different than zero when all reforms are considered
simultaneously. These results mirror the previous ones, with less precise results for FDI
liberalization but with the expected signs. Different from the baseline specification, the
delicensing measure becomes insignificant when we eliminate the annual variation, although
again the magnitude of the coefficient is similar.
[Table 9 about here.]
We also run a separate analysis that allows us to visualize the effects of reforms over time.
For brevity, we relegate the description and results of that analysis to the appendix (Figure 7).
That alternative specification has the severe downside of losing the annual variation, and
the variation in the magnitudes of policy variables, as it relies on policy reform dummies.
Nevertheless, it allows us compare relative factor shares across time in industries that can
be labeled as “liberalized” relative to industries that were never “liberalized”. This provides
very noisy estimates, but the most important conclusion is that there is no evidence of
differential pre-trends in factor shares between these types of industries. Although there is a
large literature that argues for the exogeneity of these reforms, especially during the limited
time period in which we restrict our analysis, this is a key identifying assumption and we
confirm it holds with respect to the labor share as the outcome.
To summarize, the results suggest that by reducing the price of imported capital, and
increasing the availability of foreign capital used in production, openness in India led to
an increase in the labor share relative to capital’s share of income. The theoretical model
in section 2 suggests two related mechanisms through which an increase in the relative
labor share is possible. Labor share can increase faster than capital’s share as a result
of the reduction in the rental rate of capital, especially for firms that use foreign capital.
Additionally, openness can enhance the capital-augmenting technology for firms that have
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access to an increased variety of foreign capital goods, through imports or foreign investment.
This latter mechanism generates an unambiguous increase in real wages, thus strengthening
the gains to labor since the movement in factor shares does not merely reflect a loss to capital.
In the following subsection, we check whether these interpretations are consistent with the
observed firm-level factor share changes by using firm characteristics that are salient to the
described mechanisms.
4.2 Firm-specific mechanisms
In this subsection we provide direct evidence on the mechanisms that affect the relative
factor shares working through changes in the cost of imported capital and the acquisition
of technology embodied in foreign equipment. To do so, we interact the policy reforms
with firm characteristics that are relevant to these two mechanisms. In Tables 10 and 11
we show the interactions with the openness reforms only, since those are the focus of this
study. In Table 12, we also report how delicensing has heterogeneous impacts across the size
distribution of firms, as our results on this reform relate to some of the important findings
in the previous literature.
Importers We start by showing that the reductions in tariffs increased the relative labor
share mainly for the firms that import capital. To that end, we create a dummy variable equal
to one if the firm imports capital goods at any point in the span of our data. This allows for
the endogenous extensive margin response of firms starting to import capital. Almost 60%
of firms import capital at some point, a high number reflecting the fact that our data contain
mostly large and medium-sized firms. Still, there are enough non-importers in our data to
capture the variation between these types of firms. We check the heterogeneous response of
capital importers versus non-importers by interacting the “capital importer” dummy with
the liberalization measures. Given the number of policy measures that we analyze, we can
potentially have many interactions in each specification. We only present the specifications
that include interaction terms between the importer dummy and the relevant policy reform.38
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 10 provide the first set of evidence that the average labor
share increased relative to capital share due to firms that import capital. Given the poten-
tial complementarities between imported capital and intermediate goods, capital importers
can respond more to the changes in the tariffs on the intermediate goods, in addition to
responding to the tariffs on capital. To allow for these differential responses, in the first
38We have checked that our results are robust to the number of policy measures we include by including
the full slate of policy measures plus interactions, and then reduced the specification to the policy reforms
that are of particular interest.
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column we include the interaction term between the capital importer dummy and the input
tariffs, as well as the capital goods tariffs. Once again, we fail to find any significant im-
pact from the changes in the input tariffs. Therefore, in column (2) we eliminate the input
tariffs and restrict ourselves to capital tariffs and FDI as openness reforms. We find that
the reductions in the capital tariffs increase the labor share significantly only for the firms
that import capital. For firms that do not import any capital, the impact, captured by the
capital tariff coefficient, is small and insignificant. In the last column of the table we show
results confirming lower capital tariffs increased the share of firms that imported capital, a
result consistent with Bas and Berthou (2017) and Kandilov et al. (2017).39 These results
indicate that lower capital tariffs raise the relative share of income by allowing firms to use
more foreign capital.40 The labor share response to FDI liberalization for capital importers
seems to be slightly muted. However, this effect is not very significant most likely because
FDI reform does not directly affect the intensity with which firms use imported capital.
Next, we consider the firm’s overall “exposure” to imports. To do so, we calculate the
ratio of total firm imports (of intermediate and capital goods) relative to total sales, take
the average import intensity at the firm level for all years, and interact the average with the
policy measures. In this case we present the results without the interaction terms with input
tariffs. Column (3) shows that a reduction in the capital tariff leads to a larger increase in the
labor share for firms that have higher import exposure. That is, the large importers benefit
more from the reduction in the rental rates of capital and the accompanying improvements
in the capital-augmenting technology, and therefore increase their relative labor share. With
this specification there is some evidence that FDI liberalization raises the labor share for
more import exposed firms as well. In unreported results we confirm that controlling for
intermediate input tariffs does not matter for our capital tariff results but the FDI interaction
coefficient becomes smaller.41
Overall, there is strong evidence that the increase in the labor share found in Table 7
is driven by importing firms. We find that the capital tariff reduction increases the share
of firms that import, and these importing firms experience a rise in the labor factor share
39The outcome measure in the last column of Table 10 is a dummy equal to one if a firm imports. Given
the specification with firm and state-year fixed effects, we capture the time variation of this dummy within
firms.
40If we restrict the importing dummy to equal one for only firms that import in the first year of the sample,
the interaction coefficient is still negative but about half the size. This suggests that the mechanism holds
for firms that imported prior to liberalization and could import a higher quantity post-liberalization. By
allowing for the endogenous response of some firms to start importing, the results are stronger as we pick
up the productivity effect of firms that start importing following to the reform.
41Recall that there is collinearity with the industries that lower input tariffs and have larger FDI liberal-
izations.
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relative to capital. Below we also show that the results are stronger for smaller firms, which
points towards an extensive margin effect: smaller firms are the ones that can start importing
capital when tariffs decline and benefit most from the liberalization. The theoretical mech-
anism that is most consistent with these results is a rise in capital augmenting productivity.
As more firms import, they take advantage of more capital variety. Furthermore, we have
shown above that these imports are from advanced countries that likely send capital embody-
ing a higher level of technology. Although we cannot measure capital productivity directly,
in the appendix (Table 16) we show results for a simple regression of labor productivity
(value added per worker) on importing. A cross-section specification provides unsurprising
evidence that firms that import in any year are on average more productive. We then add
firm fixed effects and regress labor productivity on a time-varying importing dummy. There
is a large and significant increase in labor productivity in response to becoming an importer.
The increase in productivity benefits labor, as it leads to rising wages, which we find as a
response to policy reforms at the industry level in section 4.3.
[Table 10 about here.]
Productive Capacity and Borrowing We continue with evaluating other firm char-
acteristics that could be important for how firms adjust their factor shares in response to
openness reforms. In particular, we analyze the role of capital intensity, R&D intensity, for-
eign ownership status, and firm’s borrowing capacity. To construct capital intensity, we take
the ratio of fixed assets to a measure of labor that we calculate by dividing total compensa-
tion by the average wage rate.42 The specification in the first column of Table 11 interacts the
initial capital intensity of the firm with capital tariffs and the FDI liberalization indicator.
The interaction term with capital tariffs is negative and significant, suggesting that the more
capital intensive a firm is, the larger will be the relative increase in the labor share following
tariff reductions. This is consistent with the interpretation that by making foreign capital
more accessible, lower capital tariffs lead to an increase in the capital-augmenting technology,
and it does so especially at higher levels of capital intensity. In fact, in Table 15 included
in the appendix, we repeat the specification in column (1) of Table 11 but split the sample
between importers and non-importers. We find that the interaction term between capital
tariffs and capital intensity measure is significant only for the importers, suggesting that the
imported capital raises the productivity of capital for importers, and it does so especially at
higher levels of capital intensity. Moreover, we find that the impact of FDI liberalization is
42Our data do not include units of labor or number of workers. Therefore, we need to construct a proxy
for labor with total compensation and the average wage rate.
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larger for more capital intensive firms. We obtain similar results on FDI liberalization for
more research intensive firms–firms that have higher average R&D spending to sales ratio–
in column (2) of Table 11. These results conform with the idea that the potential spillovers
from FDI can be exploited only by more technologically advanced firms (see Gorodnichenko
et al. (2014) and the references therein). On the other hand, we do not find any evidence
that R&D intensive firms react the most in response to lower capital tariffs.
In column (3) of Table 11, we interact the policies with a dummy equal to one if the
firm has foreign ownership. Since firms with foreign ownership tend to be technologically
more advanced and are financially less constrained, they might respond differently to tariff
reductions. We find that the increase in the relative labor share to lower capital tariffs
is stronger for foreign-owned firms. These firms are more likely to increase their use of
foreign capital, which enhances the productivity embodied in their total capital, through
their existing international supply networks. Not surprisingly, further FDI liberalization
within an industry does not affect a firm that is already foreign-owned.
We analyze the role of financial factors in mediating the factor shares’ response to open-
ness by constructing the average debt to equity ratio of the firm and interacting it with the
policy variables. The findings in the last column of Table 11 show that the firm’s ability
to borrow (a higher debt to equity ratio) intensifies the firm’s factor share response to a
reduction in capital tariffs. This could be a result of the fact that the firms who borrow
more easily, can finance more imported capital. Similarly, a larger debt to equity ratio
magnifies the increase in the relative labor share following FDI liberalization. The larger
response could be due to the notion that financially less constrained firms benefit more from
the spill-overs of FDI because it is easier for them to adopt the foreign technology brought
in by the multinationals (Alfaro et al. (2010)) or to become their suppliers (Javorcik and
Spatareanu (2009)).
[Table 11 about here.]
Size The last characteristic we consider that can affect firm’s response to openness is its
size. To motivate why this characteristic is important, we refer to trade models akin to
Melitz (2003), where the extensive margin plays an important role. In our context, factor
shares of smaller firms might respond more to liberalization, since lower tariffs would allow
the smaller firms to import capital that was already available to larger firms at higher
tariffs.43 In terms of FDI liberalization, this effect is less obvious, though again we expect
43Almost two-thirds of the firms in our sample eventually become importers at some point, probably due
to the selection of firms in CMIE. Therefore, new importers that are labelled “small” in our sample are still
relatively big firms in the context of the whole Indian economy.
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initially larger firms to have a higher share of foreign investment before the liberalization.
To test these predictions, we follow Ahsan and Mitra (2014) in creating three equally-sized
bins: “small”, “medium”, and “large”. Firms are assigned to these bins in the first year
they appear in the data depending on their sales relative to firms within an industry-year.
Columns (1)-(3) interact each of the three policy reforms with the size dummies individually.
Since we interact the policy variables with “large” and “small” indicators, these interactions
show the impacts relative to “medium” sized firms (whose response is represented by the non-
interaction term). With respect to the reductions in capital tariffs and FDI liberalization,
columns (1) and (2) make it clear that small sized firms are driving the reallocation of factor
payments to labor. This suggests that trade liberalization creates opportunities to access
foreign capital for smaller firms, allows them to enhance their capital-productivity and raise
payments to labor, which complements the capital.
Unlike the openness reforms, the impact of the delicensing reform is subdued, even re-
versed, for smaller firms. The specification in column (3) shows that the decline in the labor
share following the reduction in the licence requirements is driven by medium sized firms,
and to a lesser extent large firms.44 Aghion et al. (2008) document the rise in production
that is a result of productive firms being able to expand with the elimination of license re-
quirements. Furthermore, they find this is only true in “pro-business” states, where labor is
expected to be a smaller beneficiary of the rise in productivity. In summary, our results in-
dicate that domestic policies to promote expansion of productive medium/large sized firms,
which the previous literature documents has increased overall production, play a role in the
within-firm reduction of the share of payments to labor relative to capital. Removing size
constraints allows these firms to expand by becoming more capital intensive. However, the
policies to promote foreign capital work to mitigate some of that effect.
[Table 12 about here.]
4.3 Industry Specific Mechanisms and Aggregate Impacts
To further illustrate the mechanisms through which openness can affect factor shares, we
analyze the impact of the policy changes on the average real wage, the rental rate, as well
as total employment and real investment at the state-industry level. These specifications
are useful not only because they show how the price of labor and capital respond to policy
44Although the “large” interaction coefficient is negative, notice that the sum of the “License” coefficient
and this coefficient is still large and positive. Large firms contribute less to the labor share decline relative
to medium firms.
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reforms, but also because they allow us to look at the changes in employment, which is
something we cannot do at the firm level due to lack of data. Moreover, these results
provide us with an estimate of the aggregate impacts of the policy reforms. In the first
column of Table 13, we check the robustness of our results for the relative labor share using
the ASI data. In the second and third columns, we present the results for the logarithm of
real wages and the rental rates, both varying at the 3-digit NIC (1987) industry-state level.
We show the response of employment to policy reforms in column (4), and conclude with the
results for real investment. For all of these specifications, we include the capital and input
tariffs, FDI liberalizations and delicensing reform.45
As in the baseline results obtained using the firm level data, we find that a reduction in
the capital tariffs leads to an increase in the relative labor share at the state-industry level.
Quantitatively, we find that a 1 percentage point reduction in effective capital tariffs increase
the relative labor share by 1.1 percent, which is slightly lower than the 1.7 percent increase we
find using the firm level data. The fact that we get a similar, albeit slightly smaller, impact
using aggregate data is reassuring as it shows that the sample selection and coverage of the
CMIE data are not problematic for inference. Moreover, this aggregate estimate reflects
the combined effect of the within-firm changes in factor shares and the reallocation effects
across firms following the liberalization. It is highly conceivable that liberalization policies
changed the firm distribution in India in favor of more capital intensive firms. In particular,
by making capital cheaper, lower tariff rates might have allowed more capital-intensive firms
to enter the market, and have led the operating ones to grow faster than the labor-intensive
firms. With these adjustments in the firm distribution, total payment to capital would have
grown faster than the payments to labor, which would partly offset some of the increase
in the relative labor share within firms and explain the smaller impact we obtain on the
aggregate relative labor share compared to the firm-level impact in Table 7. Nevertheless,
we find that the 5 percentage point reduction in the capital tariffs experienced between 1989
and 1998 led to a 5.5 percent increase in the labor share relative to capital’s share of total
income, suggesting that the within firm adjustments were more dominant.
When we look at the price components of the relative factor share, we find that a reduction
in the capital tariffs raises both the average wage and the rental rate of capital. The results
in columns (2) and (3) suggest that a 1 percentage point reduction in capital tariffs increases
the average wage by 1.1 percent, compared to the 0.5 percent increase in the rental rate,
which provide evidence that the return to labor rose faster than the return to capital and
contributed to the increase in the relative labor share. The increase in the wages are further
45We estimated specifications that additionally included output tariffs. As in all our specifications, they
were not significant.
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indication of improvements in capital-augmenting technology (see (Acemoglu and Restrepo,
2018)), which in our model would be made possible by an increase in the variety of imported
capital-goods. This increase in the variety of capital goods can also lead to an the increase in
the overall rental rate of capital if firms reallocate capital towards more of the technologically
advanced capital goods that are costlier. This is in fact what we observe in column (3),
which suggests that the price channel of cheaper importer capital is negated by the change
in composition towards more costly capital. In terms of the quantity of factors used, the
results in column (4) show that capital tariffs do not have a significant impact on total
employment within a particular state and industry, despite their effect on the average wage.
While a reduction in capital tariffs does not seem to affect investment in column (5), when
we control for industry specific time trends in the last column, we find a significant increase
in total investment.46 The weak evidence on investment suggests that reallocation towards
foreign capital may be the dominant response to the reduction in capital tariffs, rather than
an increase in the total volume of investment.
Unlike the firm-level results, we do not find evidence on the impact of FDI liberalization
on the aggregate relative labor share. The lack of a significant result can partly be attributed
a possible reallocation of factors across firms. As FDI liberalization makes it easier for foreign
firms, which are more likely to be capital-intensive, to enter an industry, it can lead to a
faster increase in the total use of capital compared to labor in that industry. The last two
columns in Table 13 show that FDI liberalization indeed increased investment in capital.
This industry expansion through capital investment could have negated the increase in the
relative labor share we found within firms, suggesting that openness in terms of FDI did
not affect the overall relative labor share. Similar to the results obtained using firm level
data, we also do not find any significant effect of changes in the input tariffs. We only find a
statistically significant impact of input tariffs on the average wage rate: a reduction in input
tariffs increases the average wage rate.
Finally, we once again find that a reduction in the licensing requirements contributed to
the decline in the labor share. The aggregate reduction of the relative labor share is slightly
larger than in the firm-level specification, which suggests that reallocation magnifies the
reduction in the labor share due to a policy that reduces size distortions. We do not uncover
any significant effects of delicensing on the prices, employment or investment. However, the
signs suggest that wages decrease while rental rates and investment increase, consistent with
an increase in capital demand.
[Table 13 about here.]
46We find similar results to the ones we present in Table 13 when we include industry specific time-trends
in columns (1)-(4).
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5 Conclusion
Recent trends in factor shares worldwide have renewed interest in this topic that has po-
tentially major implications for income inequality. With plenty of mechanisms proposed to
explain the dynamics of the labor share, it is imperative to find exogenous variation in the
determinants of the labor share that allow researchers to argue for causal relationships. In
this paper we investigate the liberalization episode of India in the early 1990’s, which pro-
vides a natural experiment with large and unexpected reforms through reduction in trade
barriers and liberalized financial markets. We contribute to the literature with the first
study on the effect of foreign capital on factor shares. The investigation of this relationship
contributes to a broader literature that has explored how the role of capital in production,
as well as automation and technical change, play a role in the observed non-stability of fac-
tor shares (Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014; Oberfield and Raval, 2014; Eden and Gaggl,
2018). We extend a standard general equilibrium model with a production function that
exhibits a constant elasticity of substitution between capital and labor by differentiating
between foreign and domestic capital. Policy reforms act upon both the price of capital and
the variety of foreign capital firms can access, providing us two related mechanisms through
which openness can affect factor prices and non-neutral factor productivities.
Contrary to what might be expected given the reduction in the aggregate data, we find
that trade reforms mostly raised the labor share in India. When we examine only changes
in tariffs, but split up output, input, and capital tariffs, we find that only a reduction in the
capital tariff has a significant positive effect on the share of labor in value added relative
to the share of capital. The estimates imply that the observed industry-average reduction
in effective capital tariffs raised the wage-to-capital expenditure ratio by 8.5 percent. The
importers and the capital-intensive firms responded more substantially to the tariff changes.
We also find a statistically significant increase in the wage-to-capital-expenditure ratio in
response to FDI liberalization: a fully liberalized industry had an average increase in the
wage-to-capital expenditure ratio equal to 11 percent. On the other hand, the domestic policy
reforms we investigate – relaxing license requirements for entry and capacity enhancements
plus credit expansions – have had the opposite effect on factor shares.
In analyzing aggregate state-industry level data, we find that the increase in the rela-
tive labor share following the openness reforms was accompanied with both rising wages
and rental rates. The theoretical framework provides useful intuition about the mechanisms
that drive these results. Overall, our results indicate that the policies to promote imported
capital made a larger variety of foreign capital available, shifted the firms’ capital composi-
tion towards more sophisticated equipment, and thereby enhanced the capital-augmenting
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technology. Due to the complementarity between capital and labor, the increase in capital
productivity raised the wage rate and contributed to a faster growth in the share of payments
to labor relative to capital. At least to some degree, our results overturn the narrative that
trade liberalization is a definite mechanism through which labor loses its share of total in-
come. In fact, the aggregate trends might have been even worse for labor if the deregulatory
reforms in India did not include trade and FDI liberalization. Given the proliferation of
liberalization policies worldwide, this area of research provides a fruitful avenue for future
research.
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Figure 1: Labor and Capital Share in Manufacturing with ASI data
Notes: Data source is Annual Survey of Industries, which includes the Industrial sector. We construct total factor
compensation and value added in the manufacturing sector as a whole by aggregating observations for each state-
industry per year. Labor compensation is reported at the industry-state level by ASI, as is the value of fixed assets. To
compute capital expenditure, we multiply the value of assets by the rental rate described in (18).
Figure 2: Ratio of Labor Compensation to Capital Expenditure in ASI data: Aggregate and
Manufacturing
Notes: Data source is Annual Survey of Industries, which includes the Industrial sector. We construct total factor
compensation in the manufacturing sector as a whole by aggregating observations for each state-industry per year.
Labor compensation is reported at the industry-state level by ASI, as is the value of fixed assets. To compute capital
expenditure, we multiply the value of assets by the rental rate described in (18). For the case where the rental rate
is kept fixed, we take the average rental rate across all years. In this case the variation in capital expenditures over
time is due only to variation in the capital stock.
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Figure 3: Labor and Capital Shares with CMIE Selection of Firms
Notes: Data source is CMIE Prowess, which includes a subset of firms within the manufacturing sector. We construct
total factor compensation and value added in the manufacturing sector as a whole by aggregating observations for each
firm per year. To compute capital expenditure we multiply the value of assets for each firm by the rental rate described
in (18).
Figure 4: Ratio of Labor Compensation to Capital Expenditure with CMIE selection of Firms
Notes: Data source is CMIE Prowess, which includes a subset of firms within the manufacturing sector. We construct total
factor compensation in the manufacturing sector as a whole by aggregating observations for each firm per year. To compute
capital expenditure we multiply the value of assets for each firm by the rental rate described in (18).
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Figure 5: Capital Imports from Top Capital-Exporting Countries: Value of Imports and
Number of Products
35
00
40
00
45
00
50
00
55
00
To
ta
l N
um
be
r o
f V
ar
iet
ies
 Im
po
rte
d
20
00
30
00
40
00
50
00
60
00
To
ta
l V
alu
e 
of
 C
ap
ita
l Im
po
rts
 (m
illi
on
s $
)
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Year
Total Imports (millions $) Total Number of Varieties
Notes: This figure displays the total value of imports and the total number of HS6 products imported by India,
allowing only for capital goods from the top 10 capital-exporting countries. Trade values are in millions of US
Dollars (left axis). The right axis is a measure of varieties imported. We count a “variety” as a unique HS6 good-
origin country combination. To construct variety, we eliminate China and Germany. Although we attempt to use a
consistent classification across years, there is a possibility for an upward bias during the revision years of 1992 and
1996. This does not appear to have a large effect on the results however. Data source for the trade data is UN
Comtrade. Capital goods are classified using the end-use classification of the US Census.
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Table 1: Trading partner share of total imported capital
Rank Trading Partner Imported Capital (Percent of Total)
1 U.S. 20.14
2 Japan 16.80
3 Germany 16.73
4 U.K. 6.60
5 Singapore 4.98
6 France 4.96
7 Italy 4.63
8 Switzerland 3.10
9 Korea 2.18
10 Taiwan 1.91
All Other 17.98
Total 100.00
Notes: The data on trading partner share of total imported capital goods are from the World Bank Trade,
Production and Protection database. The percentage of total capital goods imports is an average over the
sample period from 1990 to 1997.
Table 2: Policy Variables: Averages over time
Output Tariff SD Output Capital Tariff SD Capital Input Tariff SD Input FDI Liberalization Delicensing
1989 98.9 36.7 7.01 8.86 52.0 16.0 0 0.35
1990 96.4 37.8 6.90 8.77 51.7 16.0 0 0.34
1991 86.4 37.2 5.56 7.67 43.5 14.1 0 0.34
1992 88.2 36.3 5.97 8.06 44.3 16.0 0.39 0.14
1993 61.3 30.4 3.91 5.40 30.4 10.5 0.38 0.14
1994 81.4 35.7 4.97 7.05 45.1 12.5 0.39 0.12
1995 61.1 37.5 3.70 5.49 30.9 9.13 0.40 0.12
1996 47.0 28.1 2.79 3.99 24.6 6.83 0.42 0.12
1997 42.2 27.5 2.70 3.93 18.9 6.67 0.45 0.11
1998 34.2 21.4 2.10 3.04 15.9 5.45 0.45 0.081
Notes: Output tariffs as well as FDI and De-licensing regulation indices are taken from Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) and
Topaloval (2010), and we take the simple average at the 3 digit level. Capital and input tariffs are calculated using output tariffs
and the 1993-1994 input-output table following equation 17.
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Table 4: Number of HS6 products imported by partner country
USA France Italy Japan Korea Singapore Switzerland UK Germany China
1989 650 464 463 604 243 435 449 622 . 64
1990 654 452 471 624 243 444 458 602 . 52
1991 611 410 405 558 204 400 409 551 631 32
1992 642 428 458 583 232 427 423 588 667 191
1993 676 438 490 600 272 453 436 642 678 275
1994 716 475 557 610 313 528 490 651 710 349
1995 747 530 602 648 392 563 544 697 736 420
1996 804 546 655 708 437 595 519 724 787 491
1997 835 593 680 743 491 613 559 767 801 530
1998 821 610 675 749 535 626 552 723 801 551
Notes: This table displays the total number of products imported from each partner country, allowing only for capital
goods from the top 10 capital-exporting countries. A unique “product” is identified through its HS6 product code. Data
source for the trade data is UN Comtrade. Capital goods are classified using the end-use classification of the US Census.
Table 5: US exports of ATP to India Post Liberalization
US Log Export Value Number of High-Tech Products
(1) (2) (No 1992) (4)
India=1*Year≥1993 0.738∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗ 32.513∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.073) (1.552)
India=1*Year≥1994 0.390∗∗∗
(0.067)
Fixed Effects Year, Country Year, Country Year, Country Year, Country
# Observations 2003 2003 1802 2003
Notes: This table displays regression results for specification 19. In the first three columns, the outcome measure is log US exports
of ATP products by destination-year. To compute this measure we condition on ATP products and aggregate product-destination-
year data across all products. The last column replaces the export value with the number of HS10 products to each destination-year.
The interaction variable is a product of two dummies: a dummy for the destination being India, and a dummy for years 1993 and
later. In column (2) the PostLib dummy is for years 1994 and later. Destination and year fixed effects are included in every
specification. Standard errors are clustered at the destination level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 6: Identification of σ: State Cross-Section Variation in Wages
Labor Compensation/Capital Expenditures
(All Years) (1991-1992) (1996-1997)
Average Wages (ASI) 0.115∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.057
(0.053) (0.077) (0.063)
Capital importer -0.255∗∗∗ -0.264∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.049) (0.052)
exporter 0.145∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.108∗
(0.035) (0.052) (0.058)
Markup 0.157∗∗∗ 0.087 0.152∗∗
(0.052) (0.095) (0.067)
Materials importer 0.045 -0.136∗∗ 0.084
(0.046) (0.065) (0.051)
Debt/Equity -0.001∗∗∗ -0.009∗ -0.004
(0.001) (0.006) (0.003)
Fixed Effects Industry-Year Industry Industry
R2 0.441 0.434 0.392
N 18892 1602 2564
Notes: This table displays results based on specification 21, a cross-section identification of the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor. The outcome in all columns is the relative factor share of labor relative to capital. The first
column uses all years of data and includes industry-year fixed effects. In the last two columns we include only one year of
data – 1991-91 and 1997-98 respectively – and include industry fixed effects. In all columns we include the following firm
controls: dummy for exporter, capital importer, and intermediates importer, plus the firm markup and debt to equity ratio.
Standard errors are clustered at the 3-digit NIC industry level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 7: Relative Factor Shares and Liberalization Policies:
Labor Compensation/Capital Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Capital Tariffs -0.017∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Output Tariffs 0.001
(0.001)
Input Tariffs -0.002
(0.002)
FDI Liberalization 0.113∗∗ 0.096∗ 0.094∗ 0.108∗
(0.052) (0.056) (0.055) (0.064)
Delicensing 0.100∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.089∗
(0.051) (0.041) (0.040) (0.051)
Average Wages (ASI) 0.069∗∗
(0.030)
State Credit/GDP -0.229∗
(0.125)
Fixed Effects Firm,State-Year Firm,State-Year Firm,State-Year Firm,State-Year Firm, State, Year
R2 0.888 0.888 0.889 0.889 0.885
N 18802 18802 18802 18802 18761
Notes: This table displays the main results on the estimation of (20). In all cases the outcome measure is the log of labor share to
capital share ratio. The first column includes only tariff policy reforms, the second column includes only FDI and delicensing reforms,
and the third column pools these reforms but eliminates input and capital tariffs. The fourth column includes state-industry wages,
and the fifth column includes a state-level measure of credit. The outcome variable for all columns is the log of relative factor shares.
Columns (1)-(4) include firm and state-year interacted fixed effects, plus a control for firm age. Column (5) replaces state-year fixed
effects with separate state and year fixed effects. Policy variables are all aggregated to the 3-digit NIC (1987) classification. Output
tariffs as well as FDI and De-licensing regulation indices are taken from Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) and Topaloval (2010), averaged
at the 3 digit level. Capital and input tariffs are calculated using output tariffs and the 1993-1994 input-output table. Standard errors
are clustered at the 3-digit NIC industry level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Table 8: Labor Share, Mark-up and Liberalization Policies:
Labor Compensation/Capital Expenditures Lshare-Markup Adjusted Lshare Mark-up
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital Tariffs -0.016∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.006∗ -0.002
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
FDI Liberalization 0.084 0.054∗ 0.053 0.006
(0.054) (0.027) (0.035) (0.020)
Delicensing 0.106∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗ -0.009
(0.040) (0.018) (0.031) (0.013)
Fixed Effects Firm,State-Year Firm,State-Year Firm,State-Year Firm,State-Year
R2 0.904 0.832 0.860 0.548
N 17335 17335 17334 17335
Notes: This table displays the results on the estimation of (20) on the log of labor share and the log of firm’s mark-up. The outcome
measure in the first column is the same as in the previous table. The outcome variable in the second column is the mark-up adjusted
labor share as defined in the text. In the third and the fourth columns the outcome variables are the log of the labor share and the
log of firm’s mark-up. All columns include firm and state-year interacted fixed effects, plus a control for firm age. Policy variables are
all aggregated to the 3-digit NIC (1987) classification. Output tariffs as well as FDI and De-licensing regulation indices are taken from
Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) and Topaloval (2010), and we take the simple average at the 3 digit level. Capital and input tariffs are
calculated using output tariffs and the 1993-1994 input-output table. Standard errors are clustered at the 3-digit NIC industry level.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 9: Relative Factor Shares and Liberalization Policies: Long-differences
∆(wL/rK)
(1) (2) (3)
∆ FDI 0.190∗∗ 0.133
(0.091) (0.091)
∆ Lic 0.100 0.152
(0.107) (0.097)
∆ CapT -0.025∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)
∆ IntT -0.005
(0.003)
∆ OutT -0.001
(0.001)
Fixed Effects State State State
R2 0.068 0.086 0.090
N 1052 1052 1052
Notes: This table displays the results for a long-differences specification. The outcome and regressors
are long-differences, which are the value in 1997-98 relative to 1989-90. Policy variables are all ag-
gregated to the 3-digit NIC (1987) classification in each year before taking differences. All columns
include only state fixed effects since this analysis is cross-sectional. Output tariffs as well as FDI
and De-licensing regulation indices are taken from Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) and Topaloval
(2010), averaged at the 3 digit level. Capital and input tariffs are calculated using output tariffs and
the 1993-1994 input-output table. Standard errors are clustered at the 3-digit NIC industry level.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
50
Table 10: Policy and Firm Interactions: Importing
Labor Compensation/Capital Expenditures Importer Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital Tariffs -0.006 -0.006 -0.013∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.002)
Input Tariffs -0.002 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
FDI Liberalization 0.132∗ 0.144∗∗ 0.089 -0.031
(0.068) (0.068) (0.055) (0.019)
Delicensing 0.115∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.017
(0.039) (0.041) (0.041) (0.014)
CapT*Kimporter -0.013∗∗ -0.011∗
(0.006) (0.006)
InpT*Kimporter 0.001
(0.001)
FDI*Kimporter -0.049 -0.065∗
(0.041) (0.037)
CapT*Firm Imports -0.021∗∗
(0.009)
FDI*Firm Imports 0.055∗
(0.028)
Fixed Effects Firm,State-Year Firm,State-Year Firm,State-Year Firm,State-Year
R2 0.889 0.889 0.889 0.618
N 18802 18802 18796 18802
Notes: This table interacts the policy reforms with firm-specific characteristics. In the first two columns the characteristic
is being a capital importer, captured by a dummy equal to one if a firm imports capital in any year of the sample. In the
third column the firm characteristic is its import share in total capital and materials expenditures. The outcome in the first
three columns is the log of the relative factor share.In the fourth column the outcome is an import dummy for firm-year
observations. All columns include firm and state-year interacted fixed effects, plus a control for firm age. Policy variables
are all aggregated to the 3-digit NIC (1987) classification. Output tariffs, as well as FDI and Delicensing regulation indices,
are taken from Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) and Topaloval (2010), averaged at the 3 digit level. Capital and input
tariffs are calculated using output tariffs and the 1993-1994 input-output table. Standard errors are clustered at the 3-digit
NIC industry level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 11: Policy and Firm Interactions: Productive Capacity and Borrowing
Labor Compensation/Capital Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital Tariffs -0.001 -0.015∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
FDI Liberalization -0.104∗∗ 0.097∗ 0.102∗ 0.089
(0.050) (0.056) (0.057) (0.055)
Delicensing 0.099∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040)
CapT*Kintensity -0.014∗∗∗
(0.004)
FDI*Kintensity 0.185∗∗∗
(0.030)
CapT*R&D/Sales 0.334
(0.329)
FDI*R&D/Sales 0.809∗
(0.472)
CapT*Foreign -0.016∗∗∗
(0.006)
FDI*Foreign -0.054
(0.052)
CapT*Debt/Equity -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
FDI*Debt/Equity 0.003∗∗
(0.001)
Fixed Effects Firm,State-Year Firm,State-Year Firm,State-Year Firm,State-Year
R2 0.891 0.889 0.889 0.889
N 17628 18776 18802 18802
Notes: This table interacts the policy reforms with firm-specific characteristics. These characteristics by column are:
capital intensity, research and development relative to sales, a dummy for foreign ownership, and debt to equity ratio.
Firms are categorized into these categories during their first year in the sample. All columns include firm and state-
year interacted fixed effects, plus a control for firm age. Policy variables are all aggregated to the 3-digit NIC (1987)
classification. Output tariffs as well as FDI and De-licensing regulation indices are taken from Topalova and Khandelwal
(2011) and Topaloval (2010), averaged at the 3 digit level. Capital and input tariffs are calculated using output tariffs
and the 1993-1994 input-output table. Standard errors are clustered at the 3-digit NIC industry level. ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 12: Policy and Firm Interactions: Firm Size
Labor Compensation/Capital Expenditures
(1) (2) (3)
Capital Tariffs -0.009 -0.015∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
FDI Liberalization 0.097∗ 0.022 0.098∗
(0.056) (0.060) (0.056)
Delicensing 0.107∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.041) (0.059)
CapT*Small -0.014∗∗
(0.006)
CapT*Large -0.004
(0.004)
FDI*Small 0.178∗∗∗
(0.058)
FDI*Large 0.035
(0.040)
DeLic*Small -0.167∗∗∗
(0.050)
DeLic*Large -0.089∗
(0.054)
Fixed Effects Firm,State-Year Firm,State-Year Firm,State-Year
R2 0.889 0.889 0.889
N 18802 18802 18802
Notes: This table interacts the policy reforms with a firm size categorical variable. Firms are split into three
bins, so that the size measure equals 1, 2, or 3 for small, medium, and large firms respectively. Each of the
three columns interact a separate policy measure with the size bins. All columns include firm and state-year
interacted fixed effects, plus a control for firm age. Policy variables are all aggregated to the 3-digit NIC (1987)
classification. Output tariffs as well as FDI and De-licensing regulation indices are taken from Topalova and
Khandelwal (2011) and Topaloval (2010), averaged at the 3 digit level. Capital and input tariffs are calculated
using output tariffs and the 1993-1994 input-output table. Standard errors are clustered at the 3-digit NIC
industry level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Factor Shares in KLEMS Data
This is the most aggregate available data that allows us to explore the labor share in India’s
economy as a whole, as well as in the manufacturing sector alone. The World KLEMS ini-
tiative provides the necessary data at the broad industry level (26 total industries). Figure 6
illustrates aggregate and manufacturing labor shares from 1980 to 2009. Total value added
and labor share of value added is reported at the industry level by KLEMS. We use that
data to construct implied labor compensation in each industry, then aggregate those to get
total labor income and total value added in India.47 We do the same for only manufacturing
industries and report the labor share in manufacturing and non-manufacturing only. Finally,
we also report the manufacturing share of value added.
Figure 6 suggests that the decline in the labor share is pervasive in the whole economy,
although the drop is greater and starts earlier in the manufacturing sector. In the economy
as a whole, the labor share is mostly constant until 1992, and then starts to drop. It drops
from about 52% to 47% in 2000, then drops another couple of percentage points in the next
10 years. The non-manufacturing sector follows an almost identical pattern, which comes
from the fact that manufacturing makes up only around one-sixth of the economy. In the
manufacturing sector, the labor share drops from 46% to 42% before 1992, and then drops
sharply to around 36% by 2000. It then drops to about 33% by 2009. Finally, the share of
manufacturing in the economy is constant, hovering mostly around 16%. Given the nature
of the firm data (survey of industries), and the emphasis on trade liberalization, we focus on
the manufacturing sector. Although there does seem to be a negative pre-trend in the labor
share, we leverage the difference-in-difference empirical strategy with various fixed effects
to attempt to tease out the contributions of the liberalization policies themselves to the
movements in the labor share.
[Figure 6 about here.]
47Although the construction of the dataset does assume that labor share plus capital share equal to one,
the capital share itself is constructed such that they sum to one. The labor income is actually measured in
the data, so that it makes sense to use the labor share of total value added. For this reason it is not useful
to measure the expenditure on labor relative to the expenditure on capital.
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6.2 Correlation between the policy measures
The results in Table 7 show that the effects of FDI are slightly diminished when we include the
capital tariffs as well. Therefore, we investigate the correlation of the policy implementation
in Table 14. We regress FDI liberalization on the other policy variables (as well as the
same controls and fixed effects) in order to explain why the effect on FDI is reduced when
we include capital tariffs in the specification. In both columns, with different sets of fixed
effects, there is a strong correlation between industries that lower capital and input tariffs,
and also liberalize FDI. Evidently, the effect of these policies is moving the wage-to-capital-
expenditure ratio in the same direction. However, it is still reassuring that in the industries
with less collinearity of these policy implementations, FDI moves the wage-to-capital ratio
in the expected direction. There is no evidence that the reduction in output tariffs and
delicensing is happening in these same industries.
[Table 14 about here.]
6.3 Robustness
We outline an event-study type of analysis that allows us to visualize the effect of reform
on relative factor shares over time. We stress that we prefer the main specification, which
follows the rest of the literature that captures the magnitudes of the reforms, as well as their
variation across years. The following is a further robustness check that is useful to visualize
the lack of any pre-trends in factor shares.
The method is as follows: for each 3-digit industry, we replace the Reformjt measure
with a time-invariant dummy equal to one if the industry can be counted as “liberalized”
by the end of the time period. Each industry will have a 0 or 1 for every year. We do this
separately for the three main deregulation measures. This is straightforward to construct for
FDI, as we label an industry as “deregulated” if the FDI liberalization measure is equal to 1
in 1997-98 (and was not deregulated in 1988).48 For capital tariffs, we label an industry as
“deregulated” if its effective capital tariff drops at least 1.65 percentage points (the median
across all industries), and for delicensing we count firms whose index drops by at least
0.5 (since many industries start at a value below one).49 Finally, we run the following
48Still, we lose a lot of variation as some industries might deregulate gradually. For example, the FDI
measure can increase from 0 to 0.25, to 0.5 to 1, over the sample period. More than a majority of industries
liberalize FDI during this time, but there is no clear way to try to separate this in a way where we split the
number of industries in two.
49Still, only 40% of the sample has been “delicensed” under this definition.
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specification:
ln
(
sLijst
sKijst
)
= αi + αst + (1− σ)ln
(
WageASIjst
)
+
t=1997∑
t=1988
γtReformDummyj ∗ yeart + µijst,
(22)
where ReformDummyj is time-invariant and equal to one for industries that we count as
“deregulated” by the end of the period, and it is interacted with year dummies for each year
of the sample. This allows us to plot the set of {γt} over time, which can be interpreted as
the reform’s effect of the labor share in that year, relative to the effect in 1992 (the dropped
year dummy). Given the results in Table 7, we expect γ to be positive for capital tariffs and
FDI after 1992, and negative for delicensing, with no clear trend before then.
Figure 7 plots the coefficients over time for each reform, with capital tariffs on the top
figure, FDI reform in the middle, and delicensing on the bottom. As expected, the results are
quite noisy, but there are a couple of takeaways. First, in all cases there does not appear to be
any trend in the labor share before 1992 (which is dropped, and is also the year before India
implements its reforms as shown in Table 2). Although we have cited a large literature that
argues for the exogeneity of these reforms, this visualization provides a nice confirmation with
respect to the labor share as the outcome. Second, there is a clear increase in the coefficients
after 1992 for capital tariffs and FDI, and a reduction for delicensing. This confirms the
results above that found that firms raised their labor share on average in response to FDI
reform and lower capital tariffs, but that they lowered the relative labor share in response
to lower licensing requirements. Finally, there is also some evidence that these grow over
time, especially in the case of capital tariffs. Again, the standard errors are large as we try
to exploit variation only across a cross-section of industries, but the coefficients do mostly
increase starting in 1993 and continue to do so especially for capital tariffs, though seemingly
not at all for delicensing.
[Figure 7 about here.]
6.4 Subsamples: Importers and non-importers
[Table 15 about here.]
[Table 16 about here.]
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Figure 6: Labor Share in India using KLEMS data: Aggregate and Manufacturing
Data source is the KLEMS World Initiative.
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Figure 7: Reform Dummies Interacted With each Year
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Notes: Each figure plots the γ’s estimated from specification (22). In the top figure, the reform
measure is the capital tariff, the middle figure plots the effect of FDI liberalization over time, and the
bottom figure plots the delicensing deregulation. The reform dummy is time-invariant and equal to 1
for all years in the industries that can be counted as “deregulated”. For FDI, we label an industry as
“deregulated” if the FDI liberalization measure is equal to 1 in 1997-98 (and was not deregulated in
1988). For capital tariffs, we label an industry as “deregulated” if its effective capital tariff drops at
least 1.65 percentage points (the median across all industries). In the case of delicensing, the index
must drop at least 0.5 points for the industry between 1988 and 1997.
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Table 14: Correlation of Policy Measures
FDI Liberal.
(1) (2)
Capital Tariffs -0.011∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Output Tariffs 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Input Tariffs -0.004∗∗ -0.004∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Delicensing 0.027 0.037
(0.083) (0.093)
State Credit/GDP 0.077
(0.051)
Fixed Effects Firm,State-Year Firm, State, Year
R2 0.878 0.872
N 18802 18761
Notes: All columns include firm and state-year interacted fixed effects, plus a control for firm age. Policy variables are
all aggregated to the 3-digit NIC (1987) classification. Output tariffs as well as FDI and De-licensing regulation indices
are taken from Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) and Topaloval (2010), and we take the simple average at the 3 digit level.
Capital and input tariffs are calculated using output tariffs and the 1993-1994 input-output table. Standard errors are
clustered at the 3-digit NIC industry level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 15: Firm characteristics with subsamples
Labor Compensation/Capital Expenditures
Importer Non-Importer Importer Non-Importer
Capital Tariffs -0.001 0.004 -0.015∗∗∗ -0.002
(0.004) (0.013) (0.004) (0.007)
FDI Liberalization -0.085 -0.139 0.106∗∗ 0.066
(0.052) (0.085) (0.050) (0.086)
Delicensing 0.099∗ 0.107∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.118∗
(0.057) (0.064) (0.042) (0.061)
CapT*Kintensity -0.016∗∗∗ -0.007
(0.003) (0.008)
FDI*Kintensity 0.171∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.054)
CapT*Debt/Equity -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.001)
FDI*Debt/Equity 0.000 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Fixed Effects Firm,State-Year Firm,State-Year Firm,State-Year Firm,State-Year
R2 0.890 0.896 0.886 0.896
N 10566 7044 11415 7376
Notes: In this table we repeat the interactions of policy reforms with firm capital intensity and debt/equity ratio (from
Table 11), but separately for importers and non-importers. A firm is categorized as an importer if it imports in any of
the years. All columns include firm and state-year interacted fixed effects, plus a control for firm age. Policy variables are
all aggregated to the 3-digit NIC (1987) classification. Output tariffs as well as FDI and De-licensing regulation indices
are taken from Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) and Topaloval (2010), and we take the simple average at the 3 digit level.
Capital and input tariffs are calculated using output tariffs and the 1993-1994 input-output table. Standard errors are
clustered at the 3-digit NIC industry level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Table 16: Firm Productivity and Importing
Labor Productivity (Y/L)
(Across Firms) (Across Firms) (Within Firms) (Within Firms)
Capital-Importer Ever 0.168∗∗∗
(0.042)
Materials-Importer Ever 0.102∗
(0.056)
Capital-Importer by Year 0.058∗∗∗
(0.012)
Materials-Importer by Year 0.103∗∗∗
(0.015)
Fixed Effects Industry,State-Year Industry,State-Year Firm,State-Year Firm,State-Year
R2 0.593 0.590 0.908 0.908
N 18967 18967 18518 18518
Notes: This table tests the productivity response from importing. The first two columns display a cross-section specification
where the regressors include dummies for firms that import capital (column 1) and materials (2) in any year. The first
two columns include industry and state-year fixed effects. The latter two columns display a fixed effects panel specification
where the regressors include a dummy for importing capital (3) and materials (4) in year t. The last two columns include
firm and state-industry fixed effects. In all cases we include a control for firm age, and we add controls for whether the firm
is an exporter and a measure of firm markups. Standard errors are clustered at the 3-digit NIC industry level. ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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